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ABSTRACT 
In his article The Blank Prose Crime of Aggression, Michael 
Glennon argues that the International Criminal Court’s newly 
adopted definition of the crime of aggression is so vague and 
overbroad that prosecutions under it would violate the prohibition 
on retroactive or ex post facto laws.  His arguments rest on an 
incorrect construction of the definition, ignorance of the extensive 
negotiating history and travaux préparatoires that exist vis-à-vis the 
crime, and failure to consult the elements of the crime.  His 
argument that the fact that past U.S. military action would be 
covered by the definition shows the definition’s infirmity is 
similarly flawed—again resting on fallacious interpretation of the 
definition, as well as questionable logic.  Many of his arguments 
are also unduly alarmist because it is now clear that U.S. actions 
will not be subject to ICC crime of aggression jurisdiction if and 
when it is activated after January 1, 2017, because non-States 
Parties to the Rome Statute (such as the U.S.) will be exempt from 
such jurisdiction.  Finally, his concerns about the role of the 
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Security Council vis-à-vis aggression adjudications have now 
largely been proven moot by the agreement reached at the 
International Criminal Court’s Review Conference in Kampala, 
Uganda.  While Glennon’s article does raise interesting questions 
about how the U.S. should view the finalization of the definition 
and potential activation of jurisdiction, his failure to get more of 
the details right obscures the discussion. 
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In his article, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression,1 Michael 
Glennon sounds unduly dire warning bells about what he 
perceives are the defects of the International Criminal Court’s 
newly adopted definition of the “crime of aggression.”  While 
Glennon claims that the definition violates the legal principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege because it is impermissibly vague and its 
imposition would thereby violate the prohibition on retroactive or 
ex post facto laws, neither of these conclusions is correct.  Glennon’s 
protests are apparently disagreed with by at least eighty-four 
delegations of legal advisors and experts from States Parties to the 
Rome Statute2 of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),3 
including many of the United States’ closest allies, who adopted 
that definition of “crime of aggression” in Kampala, Uganda, at the 
International Criminal Court’s first Review Conference (“Review 
Conference”).4  Many of Glennon’s arguments are based on false 
 
1 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 
71, 72 (2010) (“[T]he proposed definition [of the crime of aggression] would 
constitute a crime in blank prose—one that would run afoul of basic international 
human rights norms and domestic guarantees of due process in its disregard of 
the international principle of legality and related U.S. constitutional prohibitions 
against vague and retroactive criminal punishment.”) (emphasis added).  For 
another article critical of Glennon’s article, see Ian Hurd, How Not to Argue Against 
the Crime of Aggression: A Response to Michael Glennon 1, 6 (Buffett Ctr. for Int’l & 
Comparative Studies, Working Paper No. 10-001, 2010), available at 
http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/Buffett_10-001_ 
Hurd.pdf (arguing that Glennon fails to answer some basic questions in his 
article, including whether “aggression [should] be a crime in international law or 
not” or whether it should “be subject to individual criminal prosecution or not” 
and concluding that “none of the difficulties that [Glennon] raises provides a 
defensible argument against the project of criminalizing aggression”). 
2 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
3 An estimated eighty-four States Parties attended.  See Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010, Delegations to the 
Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, RC/INF.1 
(Aug. 26, 2010), available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-
INF.1-reissued-ENG-FRA-SPA.pdf (listing the names of delegates from eighty-
four States Parties and thirty-two non-States Parties attending the Review 
Conference).  
4 See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, 
Annex I, RC/Res.6 (J une 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def.].  Article 123 of the Rome 
Statute requests the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Review Conference to 
consider amendments to the Statute seven years after its entry into force.  See 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
910 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:4 
assumptions, errors of construction, or ignorance of the actual 
extensive negotiating history regarding the ICC crime of 
aggression.  Other criticisms—for example, that “consensus” is not 
possible as to the definition and conditions for ICC exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime5—have now been proven false by the 
agreement reached to amend the Rome Statute at the Review 
Conference in Kampala. 
Glennon also appears to suggest that because past U.S. military 
interventions, when measured against this definition, could 
constitute the crime of aggression,6 there must be something wrong 
with the definition.  First, this logic is questionable.  Second, 
various situations Glennon examines (involving collective self-
defense, Chapter VII enforcement actions authorized by the 
Security Council, or humanitarian interventions) would not be 
covered by the definition.  Third, his fear-mongering7 is based on 
purely hypothetical arguments because past U.S. actions will not 
be measured against the current definition, which will not apply 
retroactively.8  Glennon’s concerns vis-à-vis the United States will 
not come to pass for a fourth reason:  when States Parties to the 
Rome Statute (“States Parties”) reached agreement on the 
conditions for the exercise of aggression jurisdiction, a clear 
exemption from jurisdiction regarding crimes committed in the 
territory of, or by nationals of, non-States Parties (including the 
 
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 123, ¶ 1 (indicating that the conference would be 
open to participants in the Assembly of States Parties, and review would include, 
but would not be limited to, crimes under Rome Statute Article 5). 
5 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98 (describing that a lack of consensus amongst 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression resulted in leaving the 
decision of what the crime covered to the prosecutor and judges of the ICC and, 
perhaps, the Security Council, only after the defendant’s conduct has occurred). 
6 Id. at 90–94 (including the U.S. invasions in Iraq in 2003, in Afghanistan in 
2001, in Panama in 1989, in Grenada in 1983, and in the Dominican Republic in 
1965, and the use of force in Cambodia in 1970). 
7 An example of such fear-mongering is the statement that “every U.S. 
President since John F. Kennedy, hundreds of U.S. legislators and military leaders 
. . . could have been subject to prosecution.”  Glennon, supra note 1, at 73.  As 
explained below, the crime of aggression definition will not apply to past (or 
future) U.S. leaders, and Glennon clearly over-construes the scope of the crime 
when he suggests that hundreds of individuals would be covered.  See infra note 
195. 
8 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (providing that no individual will 
be criminally responsible under the Rome Statute for conduct prior to the entry 
into force of the Statute). 
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United States) was also agreed upon.9  Thus, U.S. nationals will be 
exempt from aggression jurisdiction, even when it commences at 
the earliest in 2017.10  Fifth, even if the United States were to 
become a party to the Rome Statute (generally not considered 
likely at the present time), its nationals could still avoid ICC 
aggression jurisdiction if the United States exercises an “opt out” 
declaration—another mechanism agreed upon at the Review 
Conference.11  Therefore, the likelihood of Glennon’s fears coming 
to pass vis-à-vis the United States and ICC prosecutions are 
extremely remote. 
Overall, Glennon’s article—while raising some interesting 
questions—completely ignores any positive aspects of what was to 
be accomplished at the Review Conference.  The agreement 
reached follows sound historical precedent set, inter alia, by the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact12 and 1945 U.N. Charter13 that there shall 
 
9 See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5 (excluding ICC jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression if committed by a national of or on the territory of a state 
that is not a party to the Statute).  Glennon states that “U.S. military and political 
leaders could still be prosecuted for the crime of aggression even if the United 
States maintains its position [of] refusing to join.”  Glennon, supra note 1, at 73.  
This is simply not the case.  The only (unlikely) scenario where U.S. military or 
political leaders could be prosecuted before the ICC for the crime of aggression 
would be if the United States were to permit such a referral by the U.N. Security 
Council—something the United States could easily avoid by exercising its veto 
power.  See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter (permitting Security Council 
referrals). 
10 As explained infra note 50 and accompanying text, for the crime of 
aggression to be prosecuted before the ICC, thirty States Parties would need to 
ratify or accept the aggression amendment, one year would need to pass after the 
thirtieth ratification, and an activation vote after January 1, 2017 “by the same 
majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the 
Statute” must be taken.  New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 2–3 & art. 15 ter, ¶¶ 
2–3.  See also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121, ¶ 3 (providing that amendments 
to the Rome Statute may be passed by consensus or by two-thirds majority vote of 
States Parties in either a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or a Review 
Conference called by the Assembly). 
11 See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 4.  The author is not advocating 
that course of conduct.  It would be far preferable if the nationals of States Parties 
do not commit acts that could be considered aggression and thus would have no 
need to exercise opt out declarations. 
12 The “Kellogg-Briand Pact” refers to the August 27, 1928 General Treaty for 
the Renunciation of War, more generally known as the Pact of Paris or the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact.  The Pact condemned “recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies.”  See General Treaty for the Renunciation of War art. 
1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.  For discussion of additional 
precedent, see infra note 60. 
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not be aggressive use of force by states.  Additionally, it follows the 
historical precedent set in large part by the United States, along 
with other World War II allies, at the International Military 
Tribunal for Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (Tokyo),14 where “crimes against peace” were 
prosecuted.15  One should not lose sight of what is at issue here:  
attempting to deter aggressive use of force by states that is outside 
the parameters of permissible action under the U.N. Charter, with 
the goal of preventing the often massive death tolls and human 
rights abuses that all too often ensue.16  States Parties in Kampala 
 
13 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
14 The Tokyo Tribunal was dominated by the United States.  The Nuremberg 
Tribunal was originally established by the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union by the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal in 1945.  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, annexed 
to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 
London Charter] (establishing the laws and procedures for the Nuremberg 
Tribunal).  The Nuremberg Tribunal’s findings were more broadly endorsed.  See 
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of 
the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946) 
(affirming “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”); Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Principles of International 
Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11 [¶¶ 97-
127] (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 374, 374-78, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/34 (summarizing the principals recognized in the charter and judgment 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal). 
15 See INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10, 29, 42 (1947), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf (last visited, Mar. 
31, 2012) (describing various claims of crimes against peace brought at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal).  Such prosecutions also occurred pursuant to Control 
Council Law No. 10.  See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 
1945) [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10], 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL 
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 1946, at 50. 
16 Given the massive human rights violations that almost inevitably 
accompany aggressive use of force, as discussed by this author more extensively 
elsewhere, it is particularly regrettable that key human rights organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International did not play a more positive 
role in the outcome of the Review Conference negotiations.  See Jennifer Trahan, 
The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala 
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created a historic achievement, advancing the rule of law, when 
they reached agreement on the definition of the crime of 
aggression and conditions by which the ICC may in the future, 
subject to certain procedural prerequisites, exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime.  
Section 1 of this Article provides a brief background on the 
negotiations of the crime of aggression and an overview of the 
agreement reached at the Review Conference.17  Section 2 then 
examines Glennon’s arguments in depth.  Specifically, Section 2.1. 
examines his claims that application of the definition would violate 
the principle of legality and the ban on retroactive application of 
the laws; the Article concludes that the current definition shares 
none of the flaws of the definitions used at the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals, where such criticisms have often been leveled.  
Section 2.2 examines Glennon’s claims that the fact that various 
past military actions by the United States and other states could fall 
within the definition suggests the definition is overbroad; the 
argument rests on fallacious logic and various incorrect 
applications of the definition. 
Section 2.3 examines Glennon’s arguments about the role of the 
Security Council—namely, his claim that involving the Security 
Council in determining whether a prior state act of aggression has 
occurred would be problematic, but not involving the Security 
Council could violate the U.N. Charter.18  States Parties resolved 
this once seemingly vexing problem at the Review Conference 
 
Review Conference 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 51 n.15 (2011) [hereinafter Kampala 
Negotiations]; see also Hans-Peter Kaul, Is It Possible to Prevent or Punish Future 
Aggressive War-Making? at 1, 12-13 (Forum Int’l Criminal & Humanitarian Law 
Occasional Paper Series No. 1, 2011), available at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/ 
fichl/documents/FICHL_OPS/FICHL_OPS_1_Kaul.pdf (calling on human rights 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to 
reconsider their positions); Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala 
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 OXFORD J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE, issue 5, 1179, 
1186 n.27 (2010) (calling for increased support from the NGO community for the 
Kampala compromise).   
17 For a more extensive background on the negotiations prior to the Review 
Conference, see generally THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: 
MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION (Stefan 
Barriga et al. eds., Liechtenstein Inst. on Self-Determination & Princeton U. 2009) 
[hereinafter THE PRINCETON PROCESS].  For a summary of the earlier negotiations 
and a detailed description of the Review Conference negotiations, see generally 
Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16. 
18 Glennon supra note 1, at 102. 
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when they agreed on the conditions for the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  The Security Council will 
have the first option to make a determination that a state act of 
aggression has occurred (or make a more generic referral of the 
situation to the ICC);19 the ICC, however, will also be able to act on 
its own—after referral by a State Party or the Prosecutor’s proprio 
motu action and approval by the ICC Pre-Trial Division.20  This 
solution, one that expert delegations from eighty-four States 
Parties to the Rome Statute approved at the Review Conference, is 
generally seen both to preserve the ICC’s independence and 
recognize the important role of the Security Council.  Finally, 
Section 3 offers some concluding remarks about the successful 
incorporation of the ICC definition of the crime of aggression into 
the pantheon of crimes that the ICC, subject to additional 
procedural hurdles being met, will be able to adjudicate in 2017. 
1. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE CRIME OF  
AGGRESSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF  
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE 
1.1. Historical Background 
As suggested above, the idea of prosecuting the crime of 
aggression is not a new concept.21  “Crimes against peace” were 
prosecuted before the Nuremberg22 and Tokyo Tribunals,23 as well 
 
19 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter. 
20 Id., art. 15 bis.  The Pre-Trial Division would consist of an expanded Pre-
Trial Chamber.  Compare Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 39, ¶ 1 (“the Pre-Trial 
Division [shall be composed] of not less than six judges”), with Rome Statute, 
supra note 2, art. 39, ¶ 2(iii) (“The functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be 
carried out either by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge of 
that division . . . .”). 
21 This Article only offers a brief summary of the background on the crime of 
aggression negotiations, which are more extensively discussed elsewhere.  See, 
e.g., THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17; Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra 
note 16. 
22 The Nuremberg Tribunal was created by the four Allied Powers, and only 
judges from those powers adjudicated cases.  The Tribunal tried a total of twenty-
two defendants, of whom nineteen were convicted, twelve of whom were 
sentenced to death.  For background on the Nuremberg Tribunal, see generally 
MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (1997). 
23 The Tokyo Tribunal was created by Special Proclamation of U.S. General 
Douglas MacArthur.  See Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: 
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as under Control Council Law No. 10.24  The Nuremberg Tribunal 
deemed such crimes to be “the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself 
the accumulated evil of the whole.”25  Indeed, the primary focus of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecutions was upon the crime of 
aggressive war.26  While the U.N. Charter has as a core 
foundational provision on the prohibition of aggressive use of 
force, enshrined in Article 2(4),27 it does not define aggression to be 
a crime.  The Charter system of course envisioned replacing a 
system of unilateral decisionmaking as to recourse to war with a 
collective system,28 whereby armed force may only be used in self-
 
The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 373, 387–88 (1991).  The judges hailed from eleven countries.  See R. John 
Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary 
Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 27 (1995) (contrasting the composition of the court 
in the Tokyo Trial to the court in the Nuremberg Trial).  The Tokyo Tribunal tried 
twenty-eight defendants, of whom seven were sentenced to death and eighteen to 
prison terms; two died during trial and one was found mentally incompetent.  See 
Maria Hsia Chang & Robert P. Baker, Victor’s Justice & Japan’s Amnesia: The Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial Reconsidered, in THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 33, 
37-38 (Peter Li ed., 2003) (describing the results of the Tokyo Tribunal). 
24 The Nuremberg (London) Charter defines “crimes against peace” as 
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”  
London Charter, supra note 4, art. 6(a).  See also Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) art. 5(a), Aug. 8, 1945 (adding that war 
could be declared or undeclared); Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 15, art. 
II, ¶ 1(a) (covering “initiation of invasions” but not limiting the forms of 
responsibility to planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of hostilities). 
25 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 427 (1948), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2012). 
26 “America aimed mostly at prosecuting the Nazis for the crime of 
aggressive war.”  GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 174 (2000).  “Justice Jackson was intent on penalizing the 
Germans for their war of aggression, and suggested that the United States might 
refuse to participate in the trial unless the crime of aggressive war was included 
within the Nuremberg Charter.”  Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years 
Later, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1991), (citing Minutes of Conference Session  (July 
25, 1945), reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 384 (1945)). 
27 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
28 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 lists the U.N.’s purposes and principles as follows: 
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defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization.29  After 
Nuremberg, prosecuting the crime of aggression admittedly fell 
into disuse;30 multilateral Security Council action became largely 
impossible due to the Cold War, and despite the occurrences of 
numerous mass atrocities,31 no tribunals of the Nuremberg variety 
were created during this time-period.  The most one sees is the 
U.N. General Assembly, in 1974, adopting a resolution defining 
aggression for the purposes of providing guidance to the Security 
Council.32  However, the resolution had no binding effect as such.33 
An extremely significant development, however, occurred in 
June–July 1998, when the Rome Statute was finalized.  States 
included aggression as one of the crimes over which the ICC would 
have jurisdiction.34  They essentially left a placeholder, however, 
that the crime would first need to be defined and conditions for the 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:  to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace . . . . 
 (emphasis added). 
29 See U.N. Charter ch. VII, arts. 42, 51.  A third potential use of force that 
might be implicitly permissible under the Charter would be humanitarian 
intervention.  Recent formulations of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, 
however, suggest that forceful humanitarian intervention still needs to receive 
Security Council authorization.  See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 
60/1, at 30 [¶¶ 138-39], U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
30 See Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. 
REV. 635, 635 (2007) (“Since Nuremberg [and Tokyo], no government officials 
have actually been taken to court and charged with aggressive war.”). 
31 Such mass atrocities would include, but not be limited to, those 
perpetrated under Idi Amin in Uganda, and under the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia. 
32 See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
33 All or part of a General Assembly resolution may come to have binding 
effect if it morphs into customary international law. 
34 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 1 (“The jurisdiction of the Court 
shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.  The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute 
with respect to the following crimes: (a) [t]he crime of genocide; (b) [c]rimes 
against humanity; (c) [w]ar crimes; [and] (d) [t]he crime of aggression.”). 
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exercise of jurisdiction agreed upon.35  (Many perhaps assumed 
that no such agreement would ever be reached.)  After conclusion 
of the Rome Statute, such drafting work commenced,36 taking more 
than ten years—Glennon’s article implies there were only five years 
of negotiations37—first during sessions of the Preparatory 
Commission for the ICC held from 1999–2002,38 then through 
meetings of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression (“SWGCA”) from 2003–2009, and, finally, during ICC 
Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) meetings in 2009–2010.39 
Final agreement40 to amend the Rome Statute to add the 
definition and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction was 
reached by consensus vote (that is, any single State Party could 
have blocked it) at the first ICC Review Conference,41 negotiations 
that the U.S. delegation attended and in which it participated.42  
 
35 Article 5, ¶ 2 of the Rome Statute stated: “The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime.  Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”  Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 2. 
36 Certain drafting work also occurred before and in Rome, with a number of 
state proposals and a working group just prior to the Rome Conference.  E-mail 
from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Director of the Relations with Intergovernmental 
Organizations, Union Internationale des Avocats, to author (May 24, 2011, 9:50 
PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel]. 
37 Glennon, supra note 1, at 81. 
38 See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
cod/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm.  The Preparatory Commission was created by 
Resolution F of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, done at 
Rome on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10. 
39 Once the Special Working Group’s mandate ended, discussion on the 
crime continued at the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties (held in 
November 2009 in The Hague) and at the Resumed Eighth Session (held in March 
2010 at the U.N.). 
40 It is not the focus of this Article to trace the work accomplished during 
these many years of negotiations, which has been extensively chronicled 
elsewhere.  See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17; Trahan, Kampala 
Negotiations, supra note 16. 
41 New Def., supra note 4. 
42 The U.S. negotiation team was headed by U.S. State Department Legal 
Advisor Harold H. Koh, U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp, Deputy, 
Office of War Crimes Issues, Diane F. Orentlicher, and Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Detainee Policy William K. Lietzau.  The United States, under the 
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The U.S. delegation also attended the eighth ASP meeting in 
November 2009 and its resumed session in March 2010, 
participating in the aggression discussions during the latter 
meeting.  The United States, however, had declined (under the 
prior administration) to participate in the years of negotiations in 
the SWGCA, thereby missing the opportunity to play a role in 
shaping the definition. 
1.2. Overview of the Agreement Reached at the Review Conference 
The definition of the crime of aggression consists of two parts, 
namely, a definition of an “act of state” of aggression (the act the 
state commits), and the definition of the “crime of aggression” (the 
act the individual commits).  These provisions, located in a new 
Article 8 bis to the Rome Statute, will be discussed in detail below, 
while examining Glennon’s critiques of the definition. 
As to conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, as noted above, 
States Parties agreed to two different procedures by which ICC 
aggression cases may commence.  With the first route, embodied in 
a new Article 15 ter, the Security Council is given an initial six 
months to act and refer a situation of suspected aggression to the 
ICC.43  This method is similar to the one currently available as to 
the ICC’s other crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity), which also may be referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council,44 as occurred when the Security Council referred the 
situations in Darfur45 and Libya.46  The second route, embodied in 
 
George W. Bush administration, chose not to attend meetings of the Special 
Working Group, but began participating, under the Obama Administration, at the 
Eighth Assembly of States Parties meeting in November 2009.  This late entry into 
negotiations certainly minimized, almost entirely, the United States’ ability to 
shape the definition’s text, although the United States participated extensively in 
negotiations as to jurisdiction, and also proposed various “Understandings” to 
accompany the definition, some of which were adopted.  For discussion of the 
Understandings proposed by the United States and those adopted, see Trahan, 
Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16, at 73-78.  For an interesting discussion of the 
legal effect of the Understandings, see generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Uncertain 
Legal Status of the Aggression Understandings, 10 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 229 (2012)  
43 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter.  As noted above, the referral might be of 
a “situation” generally or the Security Council might be more specific and find 
that an act of aggression had occurred. 
44 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b). 
45 See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
46 See S. C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
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a new Article 15 bis to the Rome Statute, provides that if a State 
Party has referred the case or the ICC Prosecutor has initiated it 
proprio motu, and the Security Council has not made a 
determination within six months after notification, the ICC Pre-
Trial Division may authorize the commencement of the 
investigation.47  This second method is similar to the method 
currently available vis-à-vis other ICC crimes, which also may be 
triggered by State Party referral or Prosecutor initiation, although 
for other crimes there is no waiting period and no Pre-Trial 
Division involvement.48  Details as to the jurisdictional regime 
agreed upon are discussed more fully below.49 
Finally, as noted above, ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression will only commence in the future, because States Parties 
agreed upon a delay mechanism at the Review Conference.  First 
there must be:  (a) ratification or acceptance by thirty States Parties 
of the aggression amendment; (b) the passage of one year after the 
thirtieth ratification; and (c) a vote by two-thirds of States Parties 
or consensus after January 1, 2017.50  Thus, aggression jurisdiction, 
even when these requirements are met, will not commence until 
January 2, 2017, at the earliest.  
 
47 New Def, supra note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 8 (“Where no such [Security Council] 
determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the 
Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, 
provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the 
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure 
contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided otherwise in 
accordance with article 16.”). 
48 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(a) (referral by a State Party) & 13(c) 
(Prosecutor initiation of an investigation).  A State Party referral would not 
require authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber while a referral by the Prosecutor 
would.  Compare id., art. 14 (referral of a situation by a State Party), with id., art. 15 
(as to Prosecutor initiated investigations, the Prosecutor “shall submit to the Pre-
Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation”). 
49 See infra Section 2.3. 
50 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 2–3 & art. 15 ter, ¶¶ 2–3 (providing 
such procedures for both State Parties and Security Council referrals, 
respectively). 
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2. A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL GLENNON: THE DEFINITION DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE “BLANK” PROSE 
Glennon’s concerns about the crime of aggression can be 
grouped into three broad categories:  (1) concerns with the 
definition in light of issues raised by prosecutions of “crimes 
against peace” before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well 
as additional concerns as to vagueness;51 (2) concerns with the 
definition’s scope when measured against past military action by 
the United States and other states;52 and (3) concerns about the 
relationship of the ICC and the Security Council with respect to 
aggression adjudications.53  This Article will address each concern 
in turn.  It should be noted that Glennon’s article was written when 
the definition was merely a proposed definition; however, the text 
of the definition Glennon discussed is identical to the definition 
adopted at the Review Conference.  Agreement on the conditions 
for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and 
the introduction of the delay mechanism were only reached at the 
Review Conference, after Glennon’s article was published. 
2.1. Any Infirmities of the Nuremberg Prosecutions are Absent from 
the Current Crime of Aggression Definition 
Glennon’s article commences with an examination of various 
criticisms leveled against the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal 
prosecutions of “crimes against peace,” including (a) vagueness, 
(b) retroactivity, and (c) the one-sided nature of the prosecutions 
solely against the leaders of Axis countries.  These are not new 
arguments.  The link that Glennon fails to establish, however, is 
how any infirmities with the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions 
would carry over to the present ICC definition. 
The London Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal 
defined “crimes against peace” as:  “planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in 
 
51 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 74–77, 96–102. 
52 See id. at 90–96. 
53 See id. at 102–09. 
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a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing.”54 
This definition is quite incomplete and also circular.  It 
basically states that “crimes against peace” are a “war of 
aggression,” but does not define what constitutes a “war of 
aggression.”55  Perhaps, in the context of World War II, this seemed 
unnecessary and obvious.56 
In light of the many possible forms that trans-border uses of 
armed force by states may take, the current ICC definition, by 
contrast, is far more detailed, and not in the least bit circular.  It 
states: 
Article 8 bis 
Crime of aggression 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” 
means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, 
by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, 
of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” 
means the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  Any 
of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, 
shall, in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression: 
 
54 London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6(a) (emphasis added). 
55 Roger Clark writes: “One wonder[s] why some nagging person at the 
London Conference did not ask what a war was.”  See Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg 
and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 527, 535 (2007) 
(discussing the drafting history of the London Charter). 
56 Id. at 535–36.  As Roger Clark points out, it was not, however, so obvious 
how to treat an “invasion” that did not require shooting, such as the annexations 
of Austria and Czechoslovakia.  The Tribunal ultimately characterized these 
events as “acts of aggression,” as opposed to the invasion of Poland and other 
countries, which were found to constitute aggressive war.  Id. 
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a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State 
of the territory of another State, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the 
use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against 
the territory of another State or the use of any 
weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the 
armed forces of another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, 
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another 
State; 
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are 
within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of 
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond 
the termination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which 
it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be 
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State 
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, 
or its substantial involvement therein.57 
Therefore, none of the criticisms of the Nuremberg definition 
necessarily applies to the current definition.  First, criticism that the 
Nuremberg definition was too vague hardly demonstrates 
 
57 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis. 
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anything about the current, far more detailed, definition.58  It is 
worth noting that the definition is also a great deal more extensive 
than the definition of the crime of genocide—an extremely serious 
crime that has been successfully adjudicated many times before 
international tribunals.59 
Second, in terms of retroactivity, the relevant timing should be 
considered.  “Crimes against peace” as defined in the London 
Charter creating the Nuremberg Tribunal was defined after the 
crimes at issue were committed.60  Just the opposite will be true for 
 
58 Specific additional vagueness arguments of Glennon are addressed below.  
See infra Section 2.2. 
59 The definition of the crime of “genocide” is “any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such” followed by a list of underlying crimes.  See, e.g., Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.  For discussion of the case law on genocide, see 
JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A 
TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 144–92 (2006) [hereinafter TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST] 
(describing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s case 
law on genocide); JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA 15–82 (2010) [hereinafter TRAHAN, ICTR DIGEST] (discussing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s case law on genocide). 
60 There was precedent, however, even for the Nuremberg prosecutions.  The 
1899 Hague Convention and 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes committed states to use mediation before an appeal to arms.  See Trial of 
the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 
Judgment, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 146, 149 (Mary 
Ellen O’Connell ed., 2004) (noting precedents).  The 1923 draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance sponsored by the League of Nations declared “that aggressive war is 
an international crime.”  It was submitted to twenty-nine states, about half of 
whom were in favor of adopting it.  Others had concerns with the definition, 
rather than any doubt as to the criminality of aggression.  Id. at 152.  The Preamble 
to the League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes declared that “a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international 
crime.”  Id. at 152–53 (noting that the Protocol was signed but not ratified).  At the 
meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 24, 1927, all the 
delegations then present (including Germany, Italy, and Japan) unanimously 
adopted a declaration concerning wars of aggression.  The preamble stated: ”[A] 
war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes, 
and is in consequences an international crime.”  Id. at 153.  Finally, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was signed, inter alia, by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the Czechoslovak Republic outlawing 
“recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.”  See Kellogg-
Briand Pact, supra note 12, art. 1. 
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the ICC.  The ICC may not apply jurisdiction retroactively.61  Thus, 
the ICC may not prosecute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity prior to entry into force of the Rome Statute (July 1, 2002, 
and later for later-ratifying countries).62  When the ICC does 
adjudicate these crimes, it uses the definitions agreed on in 1998.  
Similarly, the ICC will not prosecute the crime of aggression until 
after aggression jurisdiction is fully activated (in 2017 at the 
earliest),63 and when it does, it will use the definition adopted in 
the summer of 2010 at the Review Conference.  Thus, none of the 
retroactivity problems associated with the Nuremberg 
prosecutions are applicable vis-à-vis the ICC.64  (Glennon appears 
to concede as much, suggesting that the reason the current 
definition would violate the ban on retroactive application of the 
 
61 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (“non-retroactivity ratione 
personae” meaning that “[n]o person shall be criminally responsible under this 
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute”). 
62 Sixty ratifications were necessary for the Rome Statute to enter into force.  
See id. art. 126, ¶ 1.  That number was reached when the final instruments of 
ratification were simultaneously deposited on March 11, 2002, bringing total 
ratifications to 66.  For later ratifying states, the date of entry into force is 
calculated by adding sixty days to the date of that state’s ratification, and then 
proceeding to the first day of the next month.  See id. art. 126, ¶ 2.  The ICC may 
exercise jurisdiction with regard to situations in a state’s territory or involving a 
state’s citizens before ratification if there has been a Security Council referral or if 
the requirements of Articles 12, ¶¶ 2 or 3 are otherwise met.  See id. arts. 12–13. 
63 For discussion of the procedural requirements necessary for jurisdiction to 
commence, see supra note 10. 
64 See Hurd, supra note 1, at 4 (critiquing Glennon’s retroactivity arguments 
as “irrelevant . . . since no one is suggesting that the ICC should claim retroactive 
jurisdiction over aggression”).  One reason that Glennon’s position appears so 
alarmist is that he appears to be writing from a very different viewpoint than 
most international lawyers.  Glennon does not appear to believe that the crime of 
aggression is a crime under customary international law (a minority view) and 
seems to even question whether the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in 
the U.N. Charter is a rule of international law (a very uncommon view).  See 
Glennon, supra note 1, at 101 n.165 and text accompanying.  These views mean 
that his criticisms are not just ones of drafting, but that his notice problems are 
really about what he views as the creation of a new rule of international law, 
contrary to how many international lawyers would view the issue.  See E-mail 
from Pål Wrange, Associate Professor of Public International Law, Stockholm 
University, to author (June 15, 2011, 4:41 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-
mail from Pål Wrange]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/1
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
2012] MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF AGRESSION 925 
laws is due to vagueness,65 thereby collapsing his “retroactivity” 
argument into his “vagueness” argument). 
Third, in terms of the criticism that Nuremberg imposed only 
“victor’s justice” and thus was a politicized use of justice solely 
against Axis leaders,66 this situation is not present vis-à-vis the 
ICC, which may prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in three situations:  (a) when the crimes have 
been committed in the territory of a State Party;67 (b) when they 
have been committed by the national of a State Party;68 or (c) when 
referred by the U.N. Security Council under its Chapter VII 
powers.69  The same will be true for the crime of aggression, with 
certain added exceptions.70  Thus, it is whether a country has 
ratified the Rome Statute that is the most significant issue in 
determining whether jurisdiction exists.  (As to the crime of 
aggression, whether a State Party files an “opt out” declaration will 
also be significant.71)  Obviously, not all states have ratified the 
Rome Statute (particularly some very powerful ones),72 so ICC 
jurisdiction is not universal, but this is a matter of choice by states, 
 
65 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 88 (arguing that the definition does not 
provide sufficient notice to defendants as to what is proscribed). 
66 See id. at 75–76 (noting Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concern “I 
wonder how some of those who preside at the trials would justify some of the acts 
of their own governments if they were placed in the status of the accused,” and 
Supreme Court Justice (and Nuremberg Prosecutor) Robert Jackson’s reflection 
upon the “hypocrisy of the charge in light of the actions of the Soviet Union”).  
Indeed, the London Charter only gave the tribunal “the power to try and punish 
persons . . . [who committed crimes while] acting in the interests of the European 
Axis countries.”  London Charter, supra note 14, art. 6. 
67 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 2(a). 
68 Id. art. 12, ¶ 2(b). 
69 Id. art. 13(b). 
70 As to State Party referrals or cases triggered by proprio motu initiation: (i) 
nationals of non-States Parties will not be subject to prosecution for aggression 
even if it occurs in the territory of a State Party; (ii) nationals of States Parties 
cannot be prosecuted for aggression if it occurs in the territory of a non-State 
Party; and (iii) States Parties will be able to file “opt out” declarations, avoiding 
ICC aggression jurisdiction.  New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 4–5. 
71 As noted supra note 70, States Parties will be able to file “opt out” 
declarations, avoiding State Party referral and Prosecutor initiation of aggression 
cases.  Id. 
72 Neither Russia, China, nor the United States has ratified the Rome Statute. 
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and not a politicized use of the tribunal.73  Thus, none of these 
criticisms of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s prosecutions can 
necessarily be leveled in the current situation.  
2.2. The Definition of the Crime Does Not Suffer From Overbreadth or 
Vagueness 
Glennon then presents additional arguments why the text of 
the current definition purportedly suffers from “overbreadth and 
vagueness,” concluding that it fails to “provide sufficient notice to 
potential defendants as to what conduct is permitted and what is 
proscribed.”74  In making these arguments, Glennon examines the 
definition of an “act of aggression,” the definition of the “crime of 
aggression,” and the breadth of those definitions when measured 
against past military actions of the United States and other states.  
While Glennon raises some interesting questions, many of his 
arguments rest on illogical application of the definition’s language, 
a failure to read the first and second paragraphs of the definition in 
conjunction, and ignorance of the actual, very extensive, 
negotiating history.75 
 
73 Whether or not a State Party files an opt out declaration will also be a 
matter of choice.  Undoubtedly, some “politicization” enters the picture because 
the Security Council may refer situations to the ICC and may also “defer” them.  
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13(b), 16.  While involvement of the Security 
Council, a political body, in the work of a judicial institution may not appear ideal 
(although the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation (see supra note 45) 
was commendable, and the Libya referral (see supra note 46) may prove so as 
well), the role of the Security Council represented a compromise agreed upon at 
Rome that would both accommodate those concerned with the peace/justice 
tension (through Article 16), and those anxious about the ICC’s limitations by 
allowing the Security Council to use its Chapter VII authority to broaden the 
range of cases the ICC could take (through Article 13).  E-mail from John 
Washburn, Convener, American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court (AMICC), to author (March 3, 2012) (on file with 
author). 
74 Glennon, supra note 1, at 88.  This author does not challenge Glennon’s 
arguments that the principle of legality and prohibition on retroactive lawmaking, 
id. at 82–86, are applicable standards. 
75 It is a bit amazing that, despite more than 10 years of negotiations, which 
generated ample travaux préparatoires, Glennon’s article contains not a single cite to 
these negotiations.  It is worth noting, however, that the most comprehensive 
compilation of that material may not have been published when Glennon drafted 
his article.  See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17.  Glennon’s article also 
completely ignores the existence of elements of the crime of aggression, which 
were also in existence prior to the Review Conference. 
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2.2.1. Glennon’s Distortion of What Constitutes an “Act of 
Aggression” 
As noted above, the current ICC definition consists of the 
definition of an “act of aggression” (in paragraph 2), which is the 
act the state would commit, and the “crime of aggression” (in 
paragraph 1), which describes the individual’s involvement.  
Glennon first attacks the breadth of the definition of “act of 
aggression.” 
His first argument is that “act of aggression”—defined as “the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”76—is 
too broadly worded because it would cover action undertaken by a 
state in self-defense or pursuant to Security Council approval.77  
That is a nonsensical reading of the text.  Actions taken by a state 
in a legitimate exercise of individual or collective self-defense or 
pursuant to U.N. Security Council authorization are clearly 
permissible under Article 51 and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,78 
and thus are uses of armed force consistent with the U.N. Charter, 
and clearly not acts of aggression.79 
Glennon argues, for example, that coalition use of force against 
Iraq in 1990 would fall within the definition of “act of 
aggression.”80  Because coalition use of force against Iraq in 1990 
was both undertaken in collective self-defense of Kuwait, and thus 
permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and pursuant to 
 
76 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2. 
77 Glennon, supra note 1, at 88. 
78 See U.N. Charter chapter VII, arts. 39–42, 51.  
79 In such instances, there is no aggression, so one does not need to reach the 
issue that there is also no “manifest” Charter violation.  See Roger S. Clark, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the 
First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May–11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT’L L. 689, 698 n.29 (2010) (suggesting that one might also rely on Article 31 of 
the Rome Statute, entitled “Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility”).  Self-
defense could presumably include anticipatory self-defense, but, to the extent 
allowed, it would require a threat of an imminent attack.  See JANE STROMSETH ET 
AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY 
INTERVENTIONS 44 n.83 (2006) (citing authorities). 
80 Glennon, supra note 1, at 88-89. 
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Security Council authorization,81 and therefore permissible under 
Chapter VII, it clearly was not an act of aggression.82  At heart, 
Glennon’s concern may be—although he does not state it so 
plainly—that the “or” in the definition of “act of aggression” 
should be read as an “and” (that is, there must both be “armed 
force . . . against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State” and it must be “inconsistent with 
the Charter”).83  If that is his point, this is something the ICC judges 
will be perfectly capable of ruling on as a matter of statutory 
construction.  The ad hoc tribunal judges had to resolve just such a 
question of statutory construction as to command responsibility, 
where a certain “or” in the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes is in some 
situations read as an “and.”84  Another construction is also 
possible:  that action taken by a state in individual or collective 
self-defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization is not 
armed force “against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
 
81 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing “all 
necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area). 
82 Glennon’s wording is strange: he later concedes “[a]cts of aggression that 
are carried out in self-defense and those authorized by the Security Council are 
permissible.”  Glennon, supra note 1, at 89.  The point is correct; the language is 
not.  Action carried out in self-defense or pursuant to Security Council 
authorization is not an “act of aggression.”  It constitutes the exercise of self-
defense, or an authorized enforcement action. 
83 Glennon is also inconsistent here.  At one point he writes that the Charter 
“implies” that use of force is allowed if not directed against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of a state, Glennon, supra note 1, at 96, but elsewhere 
appears to also require a contravention of the purposes of the UN. 
84 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes on command responsibility state: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present 
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her 
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so 
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, ¶ 3, S.C. Res. 955, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 6, 1994) (emphasis added).  The final clause 
clearly has an “or” in it.  Case law, however, states that these are not options.  A 
superior does not have a choice whether to prevent or whether to punish; if 
prevention fails, then there must be punishment.  So if prevention succeeded, one 
would not reach the issue of punishment (and “or” might be considered 
appropriate), but if prevention failed, there is an obligation to punish (in that 
instance, the “or” is being read as an “and”).  See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note 
59, at 484 n.51; TRAHAN, ICTR DIGEST, supra note 59, at 233 n.55. 
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political independence of another State” because it is self-defense 
or an enforcement action.  
Furthermore, the language Glennon takes issue with is 
practically a quote of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter85—language 
clearly not read to preclude action taken in self-defense or pursuant 
to Security Council authorization.  In fact, States Parties at the 
Review Conference were essentially precluded from changing this 
construction, because under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, any 
treaty provision contrary to the Charter would be void.86  Thus, 
Glennon’s examples that the bombing of Baghdad in 1991 would 
be an act of aggression, as would the overthrow of the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan in 2001,87 completely miss the mark.88  
Both were recognized as actions taken in self-defense and 
authorized by the Security Council.  (Gulf War I was recognized as 
collective self-defense of Kuwait, and the Security Council’s 
authorization covered not only use of force to expel Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, but was also more broadly worded, thus permitting 
targeting within Iraq.89  Coalition forces in Afghanistan were 
responding to the 9/11 attack, which the Security Council 
indirectly recognized as triggering a right by the United States to 
self-defense.90) 
 
85 See supra note 13 (quoting Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter). 
86 See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.”). 
87 Glennon, supra note 1, at 89. 
88 Indeed, Glennon essentially later admits as much when he states that “acts 
of aggression authorized by the Security Council or carried out for self defense 
under Article 51 are not prosecutable.”  Glennon, supra note 1, at 98. 
89 S.C. Res. 678, supra note 81 (authorizing “all necessary means” to uphold 
and implement Resolution 660 and “to restore international peace and security in 
the area”). 
90 The Security Council “in its first resolutions on the events of September 11, 
‘recogniz[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter.’”  Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After 
September 11, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 905, 909 (2002) (quoting S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)).  See S.C. Res. 1368, supra; S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (recognizing and reaffirming, respectively, ”the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”); see also J.M. Spectar, 
Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law & The Use of Force in the 
Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2006) (observing that the U.N. Security 
Council “resolution recognized and affirmed the right of self-defense, thereby 
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2.2.2. Glennon’s Inaccurate Applications of the Definition to Various 
Past U.S. Military Actions 
The definition of the act of aggression continues with a second 
sentence:  “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of 
war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of 
aggression . . . .”91  It then lists various uses of force that would 
constitute acts of aggression, deriving the list from U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 3314.92  Glennon suggests that because 
certain U.S. past actions would fall within that list, there must be 
an overbreadth problem with the definition.  Not only is that not 
necessarily the case,93 but it erroneously suggests that past U.S. 
 
further cloaking (at least indirectly) the U.S. response with international 
legitimacy”).  The Security Council might have questioned whether self-defense 
permitted action against both Al Qaeda (perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks) and the 
Taliban (who harbored them), and whether the response was proportionate to the 
scope of the armed attack.  See, e.g., Ratner, supra (taking a critical look at the 
international law foundation for proceeding against the Taliban); see also Antonio 
Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International 
Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001).  The Security Council, however, appears not to 
have made such a distinction.  See Spectar, supra, at 64 (“While the Council did not 
specifically authorize the use of force against the Taliban, it was not opposed to it 
either.”).  The Security Council additionally issued no resolution condemning the 
scope of the intervention in Afghanistan, which might constitute implied 
acceptance.  The Security Council also issued resolutions endorsing the Bonn 
transitional process in Afghanistan, see S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 
(Dec. 6, 2001), and authorizing an international force presence (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, see S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), both of 
which actions suggest an after-the-fact acceptance of the Taliban’s ouster. 
91 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2. 
92 “[T]he General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression [was] conceived 
as a guide to the Security Council in carrying out its functions under the Charter . 
. . .”  Ratner, supra note 90, at 907. 
93 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90–94.  Glennon’s argument has been rebutted by 
another scholar this way: 
The key unanswered question is whether Glennon’s goal here is to say 
something about American foreign policy or about the construction of 
the [definition of the crime of aggression].  If we assume from the start 
that US foreign policy by definition cannot possibly be aggressive, then 
these cases would indeed suggest that the rule is badly written.  Without 
such an assumption, however, is Glennon trying to point out that US 
leaders have at times used force aggressively [and] in violation of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter?  [Or is he] showing that Americans are at times 
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actions will be judged by the current definition (which they will 
not, given the ban on retroactivity),94 fails to reflect that the United 
States is exempt from aggression jurisdiction as a non-State Party 
to the Rome Statute95 (an exemption admittedly negotiated after 
Glennon wrote his article), and also ignores the threshold language 
in paragraph 1 (requiring a “manifest” violation of the U.N. 
Charter), that would also need to apply to any of the acts listed in 
paragraph 2 for there to be a crime of aggression.96 
Glennon’s logic appears at its weakest when he implies that 
because U.S. commencement of Gulf War II might fall within the 
first sub-paragraph 2(a) “invasion or attack,” there is something 
wrong with considering an “invasion or attack” as an act of 
aggression.97  Indeed, an “invasion or attack” that is neither a 
legitimate exercise of self-defense, authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council, nor humanitarian in nature would seem to be a classic 
example of what should be covered as an act of aggression.  Because 
the legal reasoning supporting the argument that Gulf War II was 
authorized under prior Security Council resolutions rests upon an 
attenuated reading of open-ended resolutions pertaining to Gulf 
War I and the subsequent disarmament and inspections regime, 
and clearly received no express Security Council authorization,98 
many states, commentators, and scholars do view the 
commencement of Gulf War II as the unauthorized use of force.99  
 
Hurd, supra note 1, at 5. 
94 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24. 
95 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5.  As noted above, Security Council 
referral of aggression committed by a U.S. national or on U.S. territory, while 
theoretically possible, would be subject to U.S. exercise of its veto power.  See 
supra, note 9. 
96 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶¶ 1, 2. 
97 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90–92. 
98 One can possibly combine Security Council Resolutions 678, 686, 687, and 
1441 to argue that open-ended language found in the authorization of Gulf War I 
and subsequent resolutions pertaining to its resolution and subsequent imposition 
of a weapons inspection regime provided authorization for Gulf War II.  
However, the United States clearly sought an additional resolution from the 
Security Council expressly authorizing Gulf War II and did not obtain it, yet 
nonetheless commenced Gulf War II. 
99 See, e.g., Spectar, supra note 90 (critiquing U.S. use of force in Gulf War II).  
Spectar states: 
The Bush Administration showed great disdain for the Charter 
prohibition against the use of force in international relations by:  (a) 
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The argument that Gulf War II constituted humanitarian 
intervention is no more plausible.  Mass atrocities were committed 
by the Iraqi Government under Saddam Hussein’s leadership.  For 
example, in Iraq in 1988, atrocities were committed against the 
Iraqi Kurds during the notorious “Anfal campaign” and in 1991 
against the Shi’a.  But these crimes were too temporally remote to 
justify intervention in 2003.  Any kind of anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defense argument (on the theory that the U.S. 
believed the Iraqi regime to possess weapons of mass destruction) 
is also generally considered weak, since most scholars would 
consider anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense (if permissible at 
all) to require some form of “imminent” risk of attack,100 and 
arguments that Iraq had an active weapons of mass destruction 
(“WMD”) program appear to have been based on “outdated, 
hyped, unrepresentative, expedient, and poorly analyzed” 
information from “questionable sources.”101  Glennon’s argument 
that the United Kingdom also supported Gulf War II102 fails to 
bolster his position significantly, given there is an inquiry pending 
in the U.K. as to why the U.K. participated in Gulf War II.103   
 
electing to launch a preemptive invasion and occupation of Iraq in the 
absence of substantial legal justification; [and] (b) proceeding with the 
military option in the absence of UN approval and without the support 
of the international community . . . . 
Id. at 49.  See also id. at 84 (“Many international lawyers maintain the 
Administration’s hyper-technical reading of prior resolutions to justify the [GW 
II] invasion is ‘weak and transparent’ and unpersuasive.”); Tom J. Farer, The 
Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 626 
(2003) (“In 2003 . . . many observers detected an attitude on the part of the [Bush] 
administration of open defiance of the Charter system. . . .”); Hamada Zahawi, 
Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CAL. L 
REV. 2295, 2315–16 (2007) (“Since the U.N. never officially authorized the invasion 
of Iraq, the international community saw the invasion as an illegal foreign 
military intervention.”). 
100 See Spectar, supra note 90, at 84 (“[T]he Article 51 exception for use of force 
in cases of self-defense does not apply . . . in the absence of an imminent and 
exist[ing] threat.”).  Under the oft-quoted 1837 Caroline test, self-defense must be 
demonstrated by its “necessity . . . [as] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”  Ratner, supra note 90, at 907 
(citing Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)). 
101 Spectar, supra note 90, at 87. 
102 Glennon, supra note 1, at 90. 
103 There is currently an Iraq Inquiry in the U.K., mandated to examine the 
U.K.’s involvement in Gulf War II, including the way decisions were made and 
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Glennon’s arguments are also unduly alarmist.  Not only are 
past U.S. actions not covered by the current definition because of 
the ban on retroactivity,104 but future U.S. actions will most likely 
not be covered either.  Admittedly after Glennon’s article was 
published, States Parties at the Review Conference agreed on an 
exemption from aggression jurisdiction for non-States Parties:  “In 
respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall 
not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed 
by that State’s nationals or on its territory.”105 
This exemption would apply to investigations triggered by 
State Party referral or proprio motu action of the Prosecutor.106  
While Security Council referrals as to aggression committed in the 
territory of, or by a national of, a non-State Party would still be 
possible, given that the United States holds a permanent seat on 
the U.N. Security Council and has veto power over substantive 
votes, the United States could clearly veto any such attempted 
referral.  If the United States were someday to ratify the ICC 
Statute, it would then have the option of “opting out” of 
aggression jurisdiction (something also agreed upon after 
Glennon’s article was published).107  Thus, regardless of how one 
feels about whether or not U.S. leaders should be completely exempt 
from ICC aggression jurisdiction, it is hard to imagine how they 
could be subject to it, even when jurisdiction commences in 2017 or 
 
actions taken, to establish as accurately and reliably as possible what happened, 
and to identify lessons that can be learned.  The U.K. Prime Minister appointed 
the members of the inquiry committee.  See About the Inquiry, IRAQ INQUIRY, 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (detailing the United Kingdom’s 
inquiry process into the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict). 
104 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 24, ¶ 1 (“No person shall be criminally 
responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the 
Statute.”). 
105 New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 
106 Compare id. (dealing with state referrals and proprio motu action), with New 
Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter (relating to Security Council referrals). 
107 At the Review Conference, agreement was reached that “[t]he Court may, 
in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, 
arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party 
has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration 
with the Registrar.”  New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).  As 
noted above, an unlikely exception would exist if the United States permitted an 
aggression referral by the Security Council, choosing not to exercise its veto 
power.  See supra note 9 (discussing potential scenarios in which U.S. officials 
could be brought before the Court). 
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thereafter.108  To the extent that the existence of the definition 
might cause increased U.S. circumspection about future uses of 
military force, and perhaps contribute moral weight to ensuring 
that future U.S. interventions are either authorized by the Security 
Council, legitimate exercises of individual or collective self-
defense, or humanitarian in nature, some might consider that a 
good outcome.109  
 
108 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the process required 
for activation of the crime of aggression). 
109 Increased circumspection will also be warranted because the United 
States’ closest European allies are ICC State Parties, so the existence of the crime 
of aggression may impact their calculations more directly (particularly after 
activation), making it harder for the United States to obtain coalition partners for 
any interventions of questionable legality.  (Of course, those coalition partners 
will still have the option of exercising opt out declarations.) 
 Additionally, circumspection is also warranted because now that a definition 
has been adopted, States Parties may incorporate it into their national laws 
(theoretically, even before 2017).  Non-States Parties could do so as well.  Indeed, 
some states already criminalize the crime of aggression in their domestic criminal 
codes.  See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, National Legislation on Individual 
Responsibility for Conduct Amounting to Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 547, 551 n.29 
(Roberto Bellelli ed., 2010) (citing crime of aggression laws in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (criminal codes of the Federation, 
Brcko District and Republika Srpska), Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). 
 Domestic law incorporation of the crime of aggression has the potential to 
create aggression jurisdiction over U.S. nationals before domestic courts either 
through territorial exercise of jurisdiction or perhaps even through universal 
jurisdiction.  This Author has elsewhere suggested that further consideration 
should be given to whether the ICC should have a relationship of “primacy” to 
such national court prosecutions (so that such national court prosecutions might 
be adjudicated before the ICC), rather than the current relationship of 
“complementarity” established under the Rome Statute.  See Rome Statute, supra 
note 2, art. 17 (establishing a regime whereby national court jurisdiction can 
render ICC cases inadmissible); see Trahan Kampala Negotiations, supra note 16, at 
89 n.158 (expressing concern about the complementarity regime and the crime of 
aggression); see also Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the 
International Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression?, CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 
2012); Beth Van Schaack, Par In Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the 
Crime of Aggression, 10(1) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. (2012).  Understanding 5 states: “It is 
understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or 
obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression 
committed by another State.”  Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
Understandings Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex III, 
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Glennon also nowhere considers that many of his examples are 
from the Cold War era, a time when collective Security Council 
action was generally blocked by Soviet-U.S. rivalry, and “each 
superpower in varying ways and to varying degrees slipped the 
Charter’s normative harness.”110  During the Cold War “the two 
superpowers rather openly defied the Charter where it conflicted 
with their will to maintain ideological hegemony in their spheres 
of influence.”111  By contrast, we are now in a “new era of 
international cooperation in the post Cold War world,”112 which 
“widen[s] the potential occasions for the [Security Council to agree 
on] the legitimate use of force.”113  Thus, action that the United 
States might have taken unilaterally in the past may now be much 
more readily approved by the Security Council.  For example, the 
agreement the Security Council reached in authorizing 
intervention in Libya114 would probably have been unimaginable 
during the Cold War era.  Thus, looking at past practice from the 
Cold War era is not necessarily indicative of whether states might 
view aggressive, unilateral use of force as necessary or desirable in 
the post-Cold War period. 
Finally, in his discussion of the various subparts of paragraph 
2, Glennon ignores that for there to be a crime of aggression, there 
are certain thresholds that need to be met under the language of 
paragraph 1.  He simply fails to read paragraph 2 of the definition 
after paragraph 1—a violation of the basic rule of good faith in 
treaty construction.115  Thus, it is not just any “invasion or attack” 
 
RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def. Understandings], ¶ 5.  That 
Understanding does not necessarily impact a state’s decision to exercise domestic 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; it merely states that the amendment 
shall not create such “right or obligation.”  On the other hand, if a State Party 
wants to avail itself of the complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute, 
it presumably would want to incorporate the crime into its domestic criminal 
code.  See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17 (laying out complementarity). 
110 Farer, supra note 99, at 623. 
111 Id. 
112 Spectar, supra note 90, at 50. 
113 Farer, supra note 99, at 624. 
114 See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
115 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, done May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
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or “bombardment,” etc., that is covered; paragraph 1 also requires 
that any act of state of aggression must necessarily “by its 
character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations”116 in order for there to be the crime 
of aggression.  In none of his discussion of the various sub-
paragraphs of paragraph 2 does Glennon consider this threshold 
requirement, or that the ICC (with only limited capacity to 
investigate and try cases) is mandated only to consider the most 
serious situations.117  An understanding (also agreed upon in 
Kampala, and thus admittedly after Glennon published his article) 
that “aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force”118 further reinforces that the ICC will only 
adjudicate the most serious situations. 
The threshold requirement of a “manifest” Charter violation is 
designed to ensure that the crime of aggression is not prosecuted in 
any “borderline cases”119 or those “falling within a grey area.”120  
To understand what is a “manifest” violation, the definition makes 
clear that one must assess the “character, gravity and scale” of the 
use of force.121  Thus, factually weaker cases, such as minimal 
border incursions, would be excluded, because the act of state 
would not meet the “gravity” or “scale” requirements.122  Legally 
 
116 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
117 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Affirming that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and . . . Determined . . . to establish an independent permanent 
International Criminal Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole . . . .”). 
118 New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6.  But see Heller, supra note 
42, at 2–3 (questioning whether an Understanding can add anything that is not 
already in the text of the amendment). 
119 February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, 
at 51, ¶ 13. 
120 June 2008 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 
87, ¶ 68. 
121 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1(emphasis added).  The requirement 
of examining all three criteria (and that no single criterion could suffice) is further 
emphasized by Understanding 7 that “the three components of character, gravity, 
and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination.  No one 
component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.”  
New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 7. 
122 Thus, for example, “the requirement that the character, gravity, and scale 
of an act of aggression amount to a manifest violation of the Charter would ensure 
that a minor border skirmish would not be a matter for the Court to take up.”  
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/1
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
2012] MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF AGRESSION 937 
debatable cases would be excluded, because the act of state would 
not have the right “character” to constitute a manifest violation of 
the Charter.123  Excluding legally debatable cases means that 
humanitarian intervention is not covered by the crime of 
aggression.124  Accordingly, Glennon’s argument that the 1999 
NATO bombing operations against Yugoslavia amounted to 
“bombardment” as an act of aggression125 is misleading.  
Humanitarian intervention would not constitute a “manifest” 
violation of the U.N. Charter, but a “grey area” case that would be 
excluded.126  Glennon’s suggestion, that because U.S. arming of the 
Contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s might be covered under 
paragraph 2(g) there must be something wrong with paragraph 
2(g),127 is similarly unpersuasive.128 
 
Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 8.  The 
International Court of Justice appears to have taken such a look at the issue of 
scale in the Nicaragua case when it stated that sending armed bands amounted to 
an armed attack only if “because of its scale and effects” it would be more than a 
“mere frontier incident,” or if it were “on a significant scale”.  See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 
195 (June 27) (emphasis added).  See also Ratner, supra note 90, at 907 (noting the 
International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua holdings). 
123 See supra Section 2.2.2. 
124 See Claus Kreß, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate Future of 
the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1129, 1140 
(2009) (“[T]he international legality of a genuine humanitarian intervention, such 
as the 1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, is also open to genuine debate, and is 
thus excluded from the scope of [then] draft Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute.”);  see 
also ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 268 (2007) (“[T]here is controversy over whether there is also an 
exception for humanitarian intervention.”).  Additional provisions in the Rome 
Statute that protect against bringing legally borderline cases include: (i) the 
exclusion of criminal responsibility if conduct is permissible under applicable law; 
(ii) the inclusion of principles and rules of international law; (iii) the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and (iv) the principle in dubio pro reo (a 
defendant may not be convicted when doubts about guilt remain).  Rome Statute, 
supra note 2, arts. 31, ¶ 3; 21 & 66. 
125 Glennon, supra note 1, at 92. 
126 See Pål Wrange, Of Power and Justice, 4 GERMAN L.J. 935, 947 (2003) (“In 
Kosovo, the humanitarian goal was evident and prevalent . . . .”). 
127 Glennon, supra note 1, at 94 (“The International Court of Justice found that 
the principle articulated in the paragraph 2(g) provision represented customary 
international law and that the United States was in breach of the prohibition.”). 
128 First, the International Court of Justice ruled against U.S. actions in that 
case. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 238–245 (June 27).  Second, even then, paragraph 2(g) 
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Glennon’s point, that “the truth is that in most of those and 
other instances, a person of common intelligence would necessarily 
have to guess which side violated the Charter,”129 also fails.  
Decisions on the use of force should not be made by persons of 
“common intelligence,” but by the best and brightest with objective 
advice from first-rate lawyers and eventually reviewed by 
qualified jurists, if it comes to that.130  While there will be some 
grey area cases, there will nevertheless be many cases that are 
clear-cut to impartial lawyers and other observers, and both the 
wording of the relevant provisions and the instinct for institutional 
self-preservation will ensure that the ICC stays away from issues 
that are genuinely controversial and unclear.131 
2.2.3. Glennon’s Applications of the Definition to Military Actions 
by Other States 
Glennon then points to various uses of military force by other 
states, again as if to suggest that coverage of such acts shows 
infirmity of the definition.132  First, he cites the sheer number of 
uses of force by states from 1945 to 1989, as if to suggest 
overbreadth as to the current definition or a misconception as to 
why aggressive uses of force should be a crime.133  In fact, that 
aggressive use of force has often been resorted to could suggest 
that the prohibition on aggressive use of force in Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter—which is supposed to be treated as the highest level 
 
would still need to be read in conjunction with the requirement of a “manifest” 
violation.  To the extent that “manifest” is read in light of the Understanding that 
“aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force,” 
not all sending of “armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” would 
necessarily be covered.  New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 2(g); New Def. 
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6. 
129 Glennon, supra note 1, at 101 (emphasis added). 
130 E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64. 
131 See id.  As noted elsewhere, reasons for conservatism include the 
“manifest” qualifier, the text of Understanding 6, as well as other provisions of the 
Rome Statute.  See New Def. Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6 (explaining that 
determining whether an act of aggression has occurred “requires consideration of 
all the circumstances of each particular case . . . .”). 
132 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 94–95 (arguing that a multitude of states have 
engaged in conduct that would satisfy the definition). 
133 Id. at 94 (“By one count . . . from 1945 to 1989 force was employed 200 
times, and by another count, 680 times.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of international law (a jus cogens or peremptory norm)134—has not 
sufficiently succeeded in deterring it,135 and that additional 
deterrence (ICC jurisdiction) is sorely needed.  Glennon simply 
fails to convince one why aggressive use of armed force that 
constitutes a manifest Charter violation, often resulting in massive 
loss of life, should not constitute a crime.  Why should war crimes 
be prosecuted before the ICC, but going to war be perfectly 
acceptable as a matter of international criminal law?  Such 
arguments are arguably relics of an earlier era, when it was 
acceptable for states to resolve their grievances through recourse to 
arms.136  The fact that aggressive use of force has been committed in 
the past is no reason why it should necessarily continue 
indefinitely, undeterred, for future generations. 
Glennon cites Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and North Vietnamese military 
actions against South Vietnam from 1960 through 1975 to bolster 
his position,137 but such uses of force could also bolster the contrary 
 
134 See Cassese, supra note 90, at 1000 (“Article 2(4) of the UN Charter . . . has 
by now become a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).”); see also 
Ratner, supra note 90, at 914 (“[T]he Charter provisions on the use of force are 
typically regarded as not merely hard [law] but jus cogens.”) (citing, inter alia, 
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 
I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts art. 50, ¶ 1(a), in Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr. 
23–June 1, 2001 & July 2–August 10, 2001, 43, 337, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility]); Spectar, supra note 90, at 47–48 (“At the heart of the post World 
War II order, Article 2 paragraph 4 has been recognized as a peremptory norm jus 
cogens by many international scholars.”); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 59 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“[T]he law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself 
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the 
character of jus cogens.”) (quoting the International Law Commission’s 
commentary on the final draft of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties).  See Kreß, supra note 124, at 1130-33 nn. 7–12 (collecting a long list of 
sources). 
135 The lack of deterrence was perhaps particularly apparent during the Cold 
War when Security Council voting to condemn aggressive use of force was subject 
to U.S. and Soviet veto. 
136 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 134, at 877 (“Prior to the 1920s, states viewed 
war as a lawful means to redress grievances and alter legal relations between 
states.”). 
137 Glennon, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
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argument.  Massive fatalities occurred during the Vietnam War,138 
and an estimated 1.25 million Afghan fatalities (nine percent of the 
population) resulted from the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan.139  Does Glennon really mean to defend these uses of 
force?  Arguments regarding past uses of force by both the 
U.S.S.R./Russia and Vietnam are also hypothetical.  Not only will 
the crime of aggression not apply retroactively, but, like U.S. 
leaders, Russian or Vietnamese leaders will not be covered by ICC 
aggression jurisdiction because Russia and Vietnam are non-States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, and at least Russia is in a position to 
veto any Security Council aggression referral related to its 
nationals or crimes committed on its territory.  These limitations, if 
anything, illustrate both the conservative nature of, and a potential 
weakness in, the jurisdictional regime agreed upon at the Review 
Conference.  Earlier humanitarian interventions in Uganda, 
Cambodia, and East Pakistan140 invoked by Glennon similarly miss 
the mark, because, as noted above, the definition will not apply 
retroactively141 and humanitarian intervention will not be 
covered.142 
2.2.4. Glennon’s Additional Perceived Ambiguities as to the 
Definition of “Act of Aggression” 
Glennon next offers critiques of the particular wording of the 
definition of “act of aggression,” which he finds vague.143  His 
 
138 Fatality figures for the Vietnam War vary widely, but some median 
estimates are: 224,000 South Vietnamese military; 666,000–1,000,000 North 
Vietnamese military and Viet Cong; 300,000-1,500,000 South Vietnamese civilians; 
65,000 North Vietnamese civilians and 58,000 Americans.  Median estimates of 
total casualties for the entire conflict range between 2,850,000-3,000,000.  See 
Matthew White, Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth 
Century, NECROMETRICS.COM, http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Vietnam, (last 
updated June 2011). 
139 GREGORY FEIFER, THE GREAT GAMBLE: THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 4 
(2009) (estimating 1.25 million Afghan deaths; also estimating between 15,000 and 
75,000 Soviet deaths).  See also White, supra note 138 (mean estimate of fatality 
figures of 1.5 million for the Soviet phase and immediate aftermath). 
140 Glennon, supra note 1, at 95. 
141 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
142 See supra note 124.  Additionally, Pakistan is not a State Party to the Rome 
Statute, so actions by its nationals or on its territory could not be the subject of 
State Party referral or proprio motu action. 
143 Glennon, supra note 1, at 96–98. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/1
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
2012] MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF AGRESSION 941 
critiques concern:  (1) why only “armed force” is covered rather 
than “force”; (2) why “sovereignty” is protected; (3) the 
relationship between the definition and other provisions of U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 not expressly incorporated; and 
(4) why “armed force” was covered but not a “war” of 
aggression.144  This Article addresses each question in turn. 
First, Glennon (correctly) notes that the definition covers 
“armed force” and not “force.”145  He questions why this is, 
suggesting, for instance, that it might improperly exclude cyber-
attacks, or the use of chemical or biological weapons.146  He also 
questions why it covers armed force “by a state” and not by non-
state actors.147  These are interesting questions—but ones that were 
debated by states that participated in the extensive negotiations on 
the definition over the years.  Because, as noted above in Section 
1.1, the United States (under the Bush Administration) chose not to 
attend these negotiations (which were open to non-States Parties—
Russia and China, for example, attended and participated),148 the 
United States did not participate in shaping the definition.  
Perhaps there would be a stronger definition had the United States 
participated. 
As to why only “armed” force is covered, admittedly the 
definition is somewhat conservative.  A decision was made to 
utilize the list of acts of aggression covered in G.A. Resolution 3314 
rather than open what some described as a “proverbial can of 
worms” and try to define such acts anew.149  Today, an argument 
might be made for including cyber-attacks, but the definition is 
more conservative, and admittedly somewhat backward-looking in 
utilizing a list of acts of aggression agreed on in 1974.  Similarly, 
the definition covers “state” acts of aggression, not acts of non-
state actors.  This definition is also somewhat conservative, but it 
does not mean that non-state actors may commit trans-border uses 
of force without criminal consequences because such actions might 
well constitute the crime of terrorism, war crimes, or crimes against 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 96. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Observations as to past negotiations otherwise not specifically attributed 
are based on the author’s recollection of meetings the author attended. 
149 See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
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humanity.150  As to the use of chemical or biological weapons 
(which Glennon claims would be excluded),151 to the extent they 
would be launched by a conventional weapons system, they would 
constitute “armed force” and would be covered.152  Use of chemical 
or biological weapons also constitutes a war crime.153 
Second, the word “sovereignty” in the definition, which covers 
armed force “against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State,” hardly seems controversial.  
“Sovereignty” is another word used to describe the protection of 
states’ territorial integrity and political independence.154 
 
150 Thus, Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States would not fall within the 
definition of “act of aggression” because it was not committed by a state.  
However it most certainly constituted the crime of terrorism, various war crimes 
(such as targeting civilians and civilian objects), and arguably also a crime against 
humanity.  See Cassese, supra note 90, at 994-95 (arguing that the 9/11 attack 
constituted a crime against humanity).  Also, given a sufficient connection 
between a non-state actor and a state, it might be possible to impute acts of the 
non-state actor to the state.  See, e.g., ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
supra note 134, art. 8 (covering conduct directed or controlled by a state); id. art. 9 
(covering conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities); 
id. art. 11 (covering conduct acknowledged and adopted by a state as its own). 
151 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 96. 
152 There are “a variety of technologies that can be used to weaponize toxic 
chemical agents.  Munitions include bombs, submunitions, projectiles, warheads, 
and spray tanks.”  Chemical Weapon Delivery, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
wmd/intro/cw-deliver.htm (last modified July 24, 2011) (describing self-
contained munitions like projectiles, cartridges, mines and rockets, as well as 
aircraft-delivered munitions, both of which are weaponized). 
153 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xviii) (including 
employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices as a war crime in international armed conflict); id. art. 8, ¶ 
2(b)(xvii) (including employing poison or poisoned weapons as a war crime in 
international armed conflict); see also id. art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xx) (including indiscriminate 
weapons use as a war crime in international armed conflict).  At the Review 
Conference, it was also agreed to amend Rome Statute Article 8, ¶ 2(e)(xvii)-(xviii) 
to add as war crimes in non-international armed conflict “employing poison or 
poisoned weapons” and “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and 
all analogous liquids, materials and devices.”  See Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute, Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, Resolution RC/Res.5, 
RC/Res.5 (June 10, 2010) (also amending Article 8, ¶ 2(e)(xv)). 
154 The International Court of Justice has defined sovereignty as “the whole 
body of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the 
exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States.”  Corfu 
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge 
Alvarez); but see LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES, 8–10 
(1995) (explaining that sovereignty should be relegated to the “shelf of history as a 
relic from an earlier era”).  The protection of “sovereignty” hardly seems to raise 
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Third, as to the relationship of language in the definition taken 
from G.A. Resolution 3314 and whether other parts of that 
resolution are incorporated,155 again, this topic was extensively 
discussed at negotiations, and much travaux préparatoires can be 
found.156  For example, there was extensive discussion whether the 
entirety of Resolution 3314 should be incorporated into the 
amendment’s text or referenced, or whether only specific portions 
should be incorporated or referenced.157  Some states were 
specifically concerned about the language in Article 2 of Resolution 
3314 suggesting extensive leeway for the Security Council to 
determine that an act is not aggression,158 and Article 4, which 
makes clear that the list of covered acts in Resolution 3314 was 
open-ended, and could be expanded upon by the Security 
Council.159  Accordingly, a decision was made to utilize only 
specific portions of Resolution 3314—as reflected in the second 
sentence of Article 8 bis, paragraph 2, and the list that follows.  
Thus, to answer Glennon’s question:  “[i]s [all of] Resolution 3314 
 
difficult issues, and was not much debated at least at meetings of the Special 
Working Group.  There was some earlier debate in the Preparatory Commission 
about the term, as not all proposals incorporated it.  See, e.g., Proposal submitted by 
Guatemala on document PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2, Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Feb. 
26–Mar. 9, 2001 & Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 2001, PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.3 (Sept. 26, 
2001); Proposal submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania, 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, Sept. 24–Oct. 5, 2001, 
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add.1 (Aug. 27, 2001); see also, e.g., E-mail from 
Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36. 
155 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 97–98 (discussing the consequences of 
incorporating or not incorporating Resolution 3314). 
156 See generally THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17.  
157 See, e.g., id. at 10; see also id. at 101, ¶¶ 14–16; id. at 116, ¶¶38–43. 
158 Article 2 states: 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the 
Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not 
be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact 
that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
159 Article 4 states: “The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the 
Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the 
provisions of the Charter.”  Id. art. 4. 
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in effect incorporated by reference?”160—the clearest answer is:  
most likely no.161 
Furthermore, as to Glennon’s statement that “the Security 
Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under 
the provisions of the Charter,”162 frankly, the Assembly of States 
Parties cannot tell the Security Council what is or is not aggression; 
it does not have that competence.  The Security Council’s power 
emanates from the U.N Charter.163  Thus, the Security Council may 
in the future determine that other acts constitute aggression—
perhaps it will deem a cyber-attack to constitute aggression; 
however, if it were to make a referral to the ICC on that basis, the 
issue would be subject to de novo ICC review,164 which likely would 
result in a more conservative ruling that a cyber-attack is not 
“armed force” and/or is not a “manifest” Charter violation, and 
therefore cannot be the basis for a crime of aggression conviction 
under the Rome Statute. 
 
160 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97. 
161 Some earlier draft language suggested the entire Resolution would be 
incorporated.  This ran into heavy opposition because Article 4 would have made 
the definition possibly dependent on retroactive post-crime Security Council 
determinations.  The opposition died down when the reference moved to the 
second sentence of the paragraph, because (a) it could be interpreted as a mere 
reference, and (b) because the first sentence served as a sufficiently clear 
limitation.  But the reference to Resolution 3314 was also an accommodation to 
those who did not want, or claimed not to want, a partial use of Resolution 3314.  
See E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.  Some might still argue 
that Article 8 bis should be interpreted in light of the whole of Resolution 3314, 
but, given that 8 bis will be a provision of criminal law, any interpretation 
(particularly of paragraph 4 of Resolution 3314) would need to keep that in mind.  
See E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64. 
162 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97. 
163 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
164 The definition is quite explicit that the ICC will make an independent 
evaluation.  The amendment states: “A determination of an act of aggression by 
an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings 
under this Statute.”  New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 4.  This provision was 
seen as extremely important for preserving the ICC’s judicial independence, and 
protecting the rights of the accused by maintaining the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of proof upon the prosecution.  See, e.g., June 2006 Princeton 
Meeting, THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 151, ¶ 71 (“Many participants 
voiced a strong preference for a determination [by an outside organ] that was 
open for review by the Court . . . to safeguard the defendant’s right to due 
process.  The Prosecutor would bear the burden of proof regarding all elements of 
the crime, including the existence of an act of aggression . . . .”). 
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As to Glennon’s assertion that the current definition is 
“identical to coverage of the definition included in the Charter,”165 
that is incorrect.  He quotes language from G.A. Resolution 3314 
that “nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way 
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter . . . .”166  That is 
necessarily the case; the General Assembly has no power to change 
the scope of the U.N. Charter.  But that does not mean the current 
definition is identical to what is covered by the Charter.  The 
current definition is for purposes of the ICC; the Security Council 
makes determinations of what constitutes a “threat to the peace, 
breach of peace or act of aggression” under Article 39 of the U.N. 
Charter.  Again, State Parties have no ability to tell the Security 
Council what criteria to use in making its determinations, and 
whatever definition is contained in the Rome Statute cannot 
change the U.N. Charter.167 
Glennon also contradicts himself when he first describes the list 
of acts in paragraphs 2(a) through (g) as “exhaustive,”168 but later 
states “[o]ne can only guess” if the list is exhaustive.169  Again, 
there was much debate on this topic (the author remembers it 
occurring at both the U.N. and Princeton) as to whether the list of 
acts in paragraph 2 would be considered “open-ended” or “closed-
ended,” and much travaux préparatoires may be found.170  (Under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the judges would 
only consider this travaux if they find the treaty language to be 
“ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a result which is manifestly 
 
165 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97. 
166 Id. 
167 This is not in contradiction with the argument in Section 2.1.1 that the 
definition of the crime of aggression should be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the U.N. Charter.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  This is so in 
order to avoid conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Charter.  In the case of 
such a conflict, it is the Charter that would prevail.  Thus, the crime of aggression 
cannot alter the U.N. Charter, and if it were seen as inconsistent with the Charter, 
it is the Charter that would prevail.  See U.N. Charter art. 103. 
168 Glennon, supra note 1, at 97.  
169 Id. at 98. 
170 With an “open list,” the acts listed in subsections (a)-(g) would be 
illustrative of acts of aggression, and “sufficiently open to cover future forms of 
aggression.”  See June 2008 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra 
note 17, at 89, ¶ 75.  Those who favored a “closed list” expressed concerns that the 
principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege could be violated by an open list.  
See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 8, 10-11.  
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absurd or unreasonable.”)171  Ultimately, it was resolved to 
consider the list “semi-open” or “semi-closed”172 in that it is not 
closed, but any other act would need to meet the other qualifiers in 
the definition, which effectively “closes” the list.  Whereas a fully 
“open” list would be problematic as providing insufficient notice 
of what other acts might be covered, a semi-open list (with a 
chapeau that closes it) should not be.173  Ultimately, these issues 
will become ones of construction for the ICC judges, based on 
statutory language, aided by travaux préparatoires, if they choose.174  
At minimum, there should be no notice problems as to the acts 
enumerated in subparagraphs (a)-(g), which should cover most 
situations.  The possibility of “competing interpretations” as to 
language simply does not mean that something cannot be a 
crime.175 
Finally, Glennon takes issue that an “act” of aggression and not 
a “war” of aggression was covered.176  That issue was also 
 
171 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 115, art. 32 
(supplementary means of interpretation). 
172 See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 11. 
173 It is worth noting that the crime against humanity of “other inhumane 
acts” has been upheld many times at the international level without any express 
statutory articulation of what these other acts might be.  See Trahan, ICTR Digest, 
supra note 59, at 142-46 (citing cases).  As explained by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: 
The crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ encompasses acts not specifically 
listed as crimes against humanity, but which are nevertheless of 
comparable nature, character, gravity and seriousness to the enumerated 
acts in sub-articles (a) to (h) of Article 3.  The inclusion of a residual 
category of crimes in Article 3 recognizes the difficulty in creating an 
exhaustive list of criminal conduct and the need for flexibility in the 
law’s response. 
Trahan, ICTR Digest supra note 59, at 142 (citing Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. 
ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgement, ¶ 527 (Sept. 12, 2006)).  See also id. (citing Prosecutor v. 
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A, Judgement, ¶ 716 (Jan. 22, 2004)) (similar); id. 
(citing Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement, ¶ 931 (Dec. 1, 
2003)) (similar). 
174 If a definition were really in conflict with the principle of legality, such a 
problem could not be overcome by juridical interpretation.  That does not appear 
to be the situation here. 
175 See Hurd, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that Glennon “seems to be saying that 
any definition of aggression would be open to competing interpretations,” but if 
that were the proper criteria “all definitions are naturally flawed.”). 
176 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.  
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extensively debated during the years of negotiations177—
negotiations that the U.S. (probably unwisely) chose not to attend.  
Many states believed that if only full-scale war were covered, that 
would set too high a threshold; most expressed the view that the 
definition should cover uses of armed force short of full-scale 
war.178  Thus, it was decided that the definition would cover state 
“acts” of aggression, but with a threshold that any such “act” 
would still needed to constitute a “manifest” violation of the 
Charter to be the crime of aggression.179  Glennon’s citing the fear 
that any “use of force” will be covered180 is misplaced; only acts 
meeting all of the statutory language would be covered, including 
satisfying the “manifest” qualifier.181 
2.2.5. Glennon’s Perceived Ambiguities in the Definition of “Crime 
of Aggression” 
Glennon’s final critiques of the definition concern wording in 
paragraph 1 of Article 8bis, the “crime of aggression.”  He 
criticizes:  (1) the alleged vagueness and overbreadth of the words 
“planning” and “preparation”; and (2) the alleged vagueness of 
what constitutes a “manifest” Charter violation.182  Again, the 
“crime of aggression” is defined as the “planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State, of an act of aggression, which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”183 
 
177 See, e.g., June 2006 SWGCA meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 
17, at 144, ¶¶ 21–24. 
178 See, e.g., id. (reflecting the issue of whether only a full-scale “war” or lesser 
forms of aggression should be covered).  The latter approach was agreed upon. 
179 See supra Section 2.2.2 (discussing the “manifest” qualifier). 
180 Glennon, supra note 1, at 98. 
181 In addition, Understanding 6 now also states that aggression covers only 
“the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.”  See New Def. 
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 6. 
182 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 98–102 (articulating the discrepancies, 
inconsistencies, and major issues concerning the alleged inadequate definition for 
the crime of aggression). 
183 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
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Glennon correctly notes that the crime of aggression “can only 
be committed by political and military leaders”184—namely, 
leaders “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State.”185  He then argues 
that the words “planning” and “preparation” are too broad in that 
they “encompass a wide range of political and military activity.”186  
Yet, these words do not appear in isolation.  “Planning” and 
“preparation” would only be covered when committed:  (i) by 
someone “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State”; (ii) as to a state act 
of aggression that actually occurs; and (iii) which constitutes a 
“manifest” Charter violation.  So when Glennon argues that 
“preparation” would cover procurement of “healthcare, housing, 
retirement, and social services for military personnel and their 
families,”187 he totally misses the mark.  Such activities hardly 
constitute “preparation” for an act of aggression, and are unlikely 
to be done by someone “in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”188  
Furthermore, such activities would not satisfy the mens rea 
 
184 Glennon, supra note 1, at 98.  
185 New Def., supra note 4, art. 8 bis, ¶ 1.  Article 25, ¶ 3 is also being amended 
to add: “In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall 
apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State.”  See id. ¶ 5. 
186 Glennon, supra note 1, at 98. 
187 Id. at 99. 
188 Glennon additionally suggests that personnel from defense intelligence 
agencies could be covered.  See id. (asserting that “diplomats,” “legislators,” and 
“intelligence agencies” all play a role in initiating armed conflict).  Few such 
personnel are likely to constitute persons “in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”  Even then, 
there would also need to be an actual state act of aggression, which also 
constitutes a “manifest” Charter violation.  But it is also unclear why individuals 
involved in providing intelligence should necessarily be insulated from criminal 
exposure if all the other elements are met.  Cf. Jennifer Trahan, A Critical Guide to 
the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment: Genocide Against the Kurds, 30 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 305 (2009) (discussing the cases against Sabir Abd al-Aziz al-Douri and Farhan 
Mutlaq al-Jaburi, who were directors in Iraq’s Military Intelligence Service, and 
were convicted for involvement in the chemical and conventional weapons 
bombardment of the Iraqi Kurds in the 1988 Anfal campaign, which some 
estimate caused 180,000 fatalities). 
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requirements of the Rome Statute,189 nor Element 4 of the elements 
of the crime of aggression.190 
Similarly, Glennon discusses the drawing up of plans for 
possible invasions and contingency plans, for instance, responding 
to the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles (“ICBM”) by the 
Soviet Union or “plans to bomb Baghdad prior to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait,” as if they might be covered.191  First, the 
elements of the crime of aggression,192 as well as the existence of 
paragraph 2 (requiring an act of state of aggression), make it fairly 
 
189 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (requiring intent and knowledge for 
responsibility); see also id. art. 32 (excluding responsibility for a mistake of fact or 
mistake of law if it negates the mental elements required by the crime). 
190 The elements of the crime of aggression were also agreed upon at the 
Kampala Review Conference.  See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
Amendments to the Elements of Crimes, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex II, RC/Res.6 
(June 11, 2010) [hereinafter New Def. Elements], art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶ 3. 
 A more interesting question that Roger Clark poses is whether industrialists 
could be covered.  Although it was proposed that the definition cover those who 
“shape and influence,” rather than those who “exercise control over or . . . direct” 
the political or military action of a State—which might have clarified the matter—
that more expansive formulation was not adopted.  Roger S. Clark, Amendments to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the first Review 
Conference on the Court, 2 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 689, 697 (2010). 
191 Glennon, supra note 1, at 99. 
192 The elements of the crime of aggression are as follows: 
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act 
of aggression. 
2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of the 
State which committed the act of aggression. 
3. The act of aggression—the use of armed force by a State against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations—was committed. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established such a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
New Def. Elements, supra note 190, art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶¶ 1–6. 
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clear that an act of aggression must actually occur for there to be 
the crime of aggression.193  Thus, contingency planning for an 
attack that does not occur (responding to a Soviet launch of ICBMs), 
would not be covered.  Contingency planning for self-defense to 
ICBM strikes, or collective self-defense of Kuwait, furthermore, 
would constitute planning for self-defense and not the crime of 
aggression.194  Glennon is again creating red-herrings. 
Finally, he argues that the line-drawing for the number of 
military and political leaders to be covered is “anything but 
bright.”195  Is there such bright line-drawing for other ICC crimes, 
or crimes adjudicated by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) or the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)?  For command responsibility, is 
there advanced clarity as to precisely which or how many 
superiors will be covered?  For individual responsibility for 
“ordering” crimes, is there precise clarity which superiors might 
issue such orders or how many will be prosecuted?  Is there 
 
193 There was extensive debate during negotiations as to whether there had to 
be an actual act of aggression.  During discussion of the Elements of the Crime it 
became very clear that states wanted to include only crimes where the act by the 
state had actually been committed.  E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra 
note 36.  While the text of the elements is not necessarily determinative, there are 
a number of reasons that point away from covering “attempted” state acts of 
aggression: (i) the threshold requirement of a “manifest” Charter violation; (ii) 
paragraph 4 of Article 15 bis (the Court may . . . exercise jurisdiction over a crime 
of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party”) 
(emphasis added); (iii) the text of the Elements; (iv) the travaux préparatoires; and 
(v) that inclusion of “attempt” as a form of individual criminal responsibility 
refers to the individual accused’s role and not “attempt” by the state.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 25 (individual criminal responsibility); E-mail from Jutta 
Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36. 
194 See supra Section 2.2.1 (explaining that self-defense, which is permitted 
under U.N. Charter Article 51, is not covered by the crime of aggression).  
Furthermore, the definition will of course not apply retroactively to any of these 
situations.  The Rome Statute’s mens rea requirements as well as Element 3 of the 
Elements of the Crime of Aggression are also unlikely to be met.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (requiring intent and knowledge); New Def. Elements, 
supra note 190, art. 8 bis, Elements, ¶ 3. 
195 Glennon, supra note 1, at 99.  Glennon’s suggestion that “hundreds of U.S. 
legislators and military leaders” could hypothetically be covered, id. at 73, totally 
misconstrues how the leadership clause is designed to operate.  Delegations never 
expressed intent to cover hundreds of individuals; the understanding was quite to 
the contrary: only a few individuals would be covered at the top leadership level.  
Such an understanding is also in line with the ICC’s capacity and practice, which 
to date has involved issuance of only a few warrants in each situation country. 
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absolute precision how extensive the parameters of “participation” 
in a “joint criminal enterprise” are?  No, the ICC, ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes do not answer these questions.  The elements of what 
constitute superior responsibility, ordering and “participation” in a 
“joint criminal enterprise” have, however, been fully articulated by 
the ICTY and ICTR judges through case law.196  So too here; there 
will be some issues left to the ICC judges.  There is no reason that 
they cannot construe and develop coherent case law on the 
parameters of “preparation” and “planning,” and what precisely is 
required to show whether a leader is “in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.”  Of course, the judges will not be writing on a blank slate 
either; the judges will have Nuremberg, Tokyo and Control 
Council Law No. 10 jurisprudence to draw upon, as well as ICTY 
and ICTR jurisprudence.197 
Finally, Glennon—who in earlier discussion disregarded the 
“manifest” requirement198—argues that it is too unclear to be used 
 
196 Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at Chapters IV–V (setting forth ICTR 
case law on individual and command responsibility); see id. at Chapters V–VI 
(setting forth ICTY case law on individual and command responsibility). 
197 There is ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence as to what constitutes “planning.”  
Under ICTR jurisprudence, for example: “The actus reus of ‘planning’ requires that 
one or more persons design the criminal conduct constituting one or more 
statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.”  Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 479 (Nov. 28, 2007).  The individual’s involvement 
must substantially contribute to the crime.  “It is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
planning was a factor substantially contributing to [the] criminal conduct.  The 
mens rea for [planning] entails the intent to plan the commission of a crime or, at a 
minimum, the awareness of substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed 
in the execution of the acts or omissions planned.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Similar 
requirements can be found under ICTY case law.  See Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra 
note 59, at 353–55 (for ICTY case law on the elements of “planning”). 
 Glennon also argues that the definition is too vague because it has not defined 
terms such as “annexation” or “force.”  Glennon, supra note 1, at 110.  First, as he 
noted, the relevant term is “armed force” not “force,” so it is that term the judges 
will construe.  No doubt, absurd and academic hypotheticals could be crafted, but 
to this author, what constitutes “armed force,” would seem rather obvious; to the 
extent there are “grey areas,” they would not qualify, as that would not constitute 
a “manifest” Charter violation.  See Section 2.2.2 supra (discussing the “manifest” 
qualifier which would exclude grey areas); see also supra note 124 (discussing 
additional reasons for jurisprudential caution in unclear cases).  Similarly, 
“annexation” appears to be a fairly straightforward concept, as in Iraq’s 1991 
annexation of Kuwait.  To the extent a state is in doubt as to whether its actions 
constitute “annexation,” it could attempt to obtain Security Council authorization 
for its actions. 
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in making determinations as to the crime of aggression.199  What 
the manifest requirement does, as explained above, is set a 
threshold.200  Other ICC crimes have similar thresholds:  genocide 
is only committed when there is intent to destroy in whole or in 
part a substantial part of a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.201  Crimes against humanity are only committed when there 
is a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.202 
War crimes before the ICC will be prosecuted “particularly when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”203  The parameters of these thresholds 
are not found in statutory language, but in the case law.204  
 
 As to the precise parameters of such terms, one should also keep in mind that 
when the ICTY and ICTR started adjudicating cases of genocide, they had little 
guidance, but had to develop case law on what is (1) “intent” (2) to “destroy” (3) 
“in whole or in part” (4) a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (5) “as 
such,” and (6) the components of the underlying crimes of genocide, and (7) the 
parameters of all the forms of individual and command responsibility.  See, e.g., 
Hurd, supra note 1, at 4 (“The law against genocide is equally vague [as the 
aggression definition] and yet it has been successfully prosecuted by international 
tribunals.”).  There is, of course, now, robust case law on the elements of genocide.  
See Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 144–92 (ICTY case law on genocide); 
Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 15–82 (ICTR case law on genocide).  But 
when the ad hoc tribunals commenced their work, this did not exist.  So too with 
the crime of aggression: perhaps we do not have a complete understanding of the 
precise parameters of “armed force” or “annexation,” but some work necessarily 
must be left to the judges.  If it were to become apparent to the ASP in the future 
that certain terms within the aggression definition need to be further defined, 
States Parties could achieve that by further statutory amendment or amendment 
to the elements of the crime.  (This Article does not discuss each situation Glennon 
mentions in his article; the failure by this author to discuss a particular situation 
does not imply this author’s acceptance of his arguments.) 
198 See supra Section 2.2.2. 
199 Glennon, supra note 1, at 100–02. 
200 See supra Section 2.2.2. 
201 See Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 27–28 (describing ICTR cases 
applying the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 
158–59 (describing ICTY cases applying the substantial part requirement). 
202 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 
84, art. 3; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7, ¶ 1. 
203 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 1. 
204 See Trahan, ICTR Digest, supra note 59, at 27–28 (describing ICTR cases on 
the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 158–59 
(describing ICTY cases on the substantial part requirement); Trahan, ICTR Digest, 
supra note 59, at 83–92 (describing ICTR cases on “widespread” and “systematic”); 
Trahan, ICTY Digest, supra note 59, at 213–221 (describing ICTY cases on 
“widespread” and “systematic”). 
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International criminal law does not require absolute precision of all 
parameters for something to be a crime.  For example, several ICC 
war crimes apply to the targeting of “civilians,”205 but that term is 
not defined in the Rome Statute or the elements of crimes, even 
though, in the context of armed conflict, it is not always apparent 
who is a “civilian.”206  Clearly the existence of ambiguities in 
terminology does not prevent the targeting of civilians from being 
a war crime.  Some wording must necessarily be interpreted by the 
judges.207 
Glennon also discusses several complicated situations where 
the United States has responded to terrorist attacks, or against 
countries suspected of harboring terrorists, through the use of 
force, such as U.S. bombing of targets in Libya in response to the 
bombing of a Berlin nightclub in 1986.208  These indeed are difficult 
scenarios because the question implicated is quite profound:  is 
military force a proper response to terrorism or should such 
 
205 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(i) (listing “[i]ntentionally 
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” as a war crime in an international 
armed conflict); id. art. 8, ¶ 2 (e)(i) (listing “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against 
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct 
part in hostilities” as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict). 
206 Someone who initially was a civilian may become a combatant by taking 
up arms and engaging in hostilities.  Likewise, someone who was a combatant 
could retire or become incapacitated (hors de combat) and lose combatant status.  
When armed conflict involves persons fighting out of uniform, making these 
distinctions becomes even more complex. 
207 Furthermore, as explained above, the judges have express guidance here: 
The requirement of a “manifest violation” has to consider the “character, gravity 
and scale” of the incursion.  This mandates examination of at least two very 
different criteria: (a) gravity and scale go to the size of the trans-border incursion, 
and (b) “character” goes to why armed force is used.  See supra Section 2.2.2.  
Significantly, the definition connects these words with an “and,” so one would 
need to consider both the size of the incursion as well as its character.  The 
importance of all three criteria (character, gravity and scale) is further emphasized 
by Understanding 7 (proposed and negotiated by the U.S. at Kampala).  New Def. 
Understandings, supra note 109, ¶ 7 (emphasizing that the three criteria must be 
sufficient to justify the “manifest” determination). 
208 Glennon, supra note 1, at 101.  Other examples Glennon raises are U.S. 
drone missile attacks against targets in Pakistan; U.S. air strikes against 
Afghanistan and Sudan following the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania; and surprise air attacks in 1998 by the U.S. under the Clinton 
Administration against six sites in Afghanistan and one in Sudan.  Id. at 92. 
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incidents be treated as the crime of terrorism?209  Vast numbers of 
articles have been written by legal scholars on this complex 
subject.210  While the international legal community is grappling 
with the proper legal framework for responding to terrorism 
(whether under the laws of war or as an international crime), this 
author will suggest that such examples, which again are 
hypothetical because the definition will not apply retroactively or 
to U.S. actions, would most likely not constitute “manifest” Charter 
violations.211  As noted above, the word “manifest” is designed to 
 
209 Prior to the attacks of 9/11 (and to some extent, afterwards), most such 
incidents were treated under the criminal law framework, with warrants issued, 
arrests made, and prosecutions (at least within the U.S.) before federal courts.  See 
RICHARD ZABEL & JAMES BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-
pursuit-justice.pdf (discussing the ability of U.S. courts to try international 
terrorism cases); Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different 
Approaches, 8 NEW ENG. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. Ann. 215 (2002) (surveying and 
discussing international terrorism conventions).  
 Subsequent to 9/11, the Security Council implicitly recognized the right of the 
United States to utilize self-defense.  See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 90; S.C. Res. 
1373, supra note 90.  Thus, primarily a military framework has been used by the 
United States in countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, with 
utilization of the Geneva Conventions (or parts of them) and use of military 
commission trials at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  See Jennifer 
Trahan, Procedures for Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They 
Satisfy International and Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 780 (2007) 
(discussing some of the concerns with such military commission trials). 
210 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors 
Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2005) (addressing 
whether the United States is, or was, fighting a Global War on Terror); Gabor 
Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the War 
on Terror, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55 (2003) (arguing that international 
humanitarian law should be applied in situations of armed conflict).  Some of the 
questions at issue include: “If this is a legitimate ‘war’ [against terror], who is the 
enemy?  When did such a war commence—on September 11, 2001, or prior 
thereto?  And when will such a war cease—or will it continue indefinitely, 
allowing the United States to apprehend suspected terrorists worldwide 
indefinitely?”  Trahan, Terrorism Conventions, supra note 209, at 790.  But see, e.g., 
John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 209-15 
(2004) (asserting that the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda qualifies as war, which 
justifies American use of military force). 
211 This author, however, does not imply that all responses to terrorism 
should necessarily be deemed acceptable under the U.N. Charter or beyond the 
scope of legal scrutiny. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/1
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
2012] MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF AGRESSION 955 
exclude “borderline cases”212 or those “falling within a grey 
area.”213  Because of the legal uncertainty as to the parameters of 
what some have referred to as the “Global War on Terror” 
(“GWOT”) and whether the laws of war may properly apply 
beyond what appears to be a conventional battlefield—or whether 
beyond a conventional battlefield, criminal law should apply214—
we are probably in a legal “grey” area, which suggests against 
prosecution.215  This again illustrates the somewhat conservative 
nature of the definition of the crime. 
2.3. The Agreement on the Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
over the Crime of Aggression Successfully Resolves the Role of the 
U.N. Security Council as to the Crime 
Glennon’s final major concern pertains to the role of the U.N. 
Security Council vis-à-vis ICC adjudications of the crime of 
aggression.216  At the time he was writing, there were two major 
competing positions:  (1) that the Security Council necessarily must 
be involved in determining whether a state had committed an “act 
of aggression” before the ICC could adjudicate the crime of 
aggression; and (2) a quite different view that to have the Security 
Council (a political body) play such an exclusive role would 
undermine the independence of the ICC (a judicial institution), and 
that the ICC is quite capable of determining for itself whether a 
state has committed an “act of aggression” in the course of 
adjudicating the crime of aggression.  These issues had been 
contentiously debated over the years of the negotiations.  (Other 
proposals, since rejected, included involving the International 
Court of Justice or the U.N. General Assembly in the initial 
 
212 February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, 
at 51, ¶ 13. 
213  June 2008 SWGCA Meeting in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, at 
87, ¶ 68. 
214 This author would primarily endorse the latter approach and reject the 
approach that the entire world may properly be considered a “battlefield” in 
responding to terrorism.  It might be possible, however, to apply the laws of war 
not only to traditional battlefields (parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan), but also to 
members of Al Qaeda or the Taliban acting elsewhere who play a role in directing 
hostilities or have a “nexus” with them. 
215 Additional reasons against prosecution in debatable cases are discussed 
above.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
216 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102. 
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determination of whether a state had committed an act of 
aggression).217 
Glennon presents various concerns about the dangers of 
including the Security Council in making aggression referrals 
(although, here, his concerns are not in fact ones states’ delegations 
expressed during actual negotiations), and various concerns about 
excluding the Security Council (concerns delegations did in fact 
articulate).218  Most of his arguments are moot, because neither 
situation has fully come to pass.  As noted above, States Parties at 
the ICC Review Conference (subsequent to the publication of 
Glennon’s article) reached a compromise regarding the conditions 
under which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression that permits, but does not mandate, Security Council 
involvement.219  This compromise resolves or obviates most 
problems Glennon raises. 
2.3.1.  The Perceived Danger of Including the Security Council in 
Making Aggression Referrals 
Glennon starts by raising concerns with having the Security 
Council be the exclusive entity that would initiate a case by either 
making a determination that an act of aggression had occurred, or 
making a more generic referral to the ICC.220  Glennon argues that 
because the Security Council cannot be bound by the ICC 
definition, its referral would be “ex post facto,” resting purely on a 
“policy judgment,”221 and amount to a “political roulette wheel.”222  
He argues that a “Security Council prosecutorial predicate would 
make a person criminally responsible under the Statute even though 
the conduct in question constitutes . . . a crime that is not within 
the jurisdiction of the court.”223  (While Glennon is assuming in this 
scenario that “only” the Security Council could make such 
referrals—an assumption now moot because the amendment does 
 
217 The various competing positions on jurisdiction are described in depth in 
THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 17, and in Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra 
note 16. 
218 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102.  
219 See supra Section 1.2. 
220 Glennon, supra note 1, at 102. 
221 Id. at 103. 
222 Id. at 73. 
223 Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
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not exclusively utilize Security Council referrals—this Article will 
nonetheless examine his concerns because the Security Council, 
under the jurisdictional regime agreed upon, still has the option of 
making a referral under the new Article 15 ter.)224 
When Glennon argues that a “Security Council prosecutorial 
predicate would make a person criminally responsible,”225 Glennon 
is confusing the “referral” by the Security Council and the 
substantive merits determination by the ICC.  Assume the Security 
Council acts in some totally arbitrary way and makes an absurd 
aggression referral; whether an act of aggression was committed 
would be subject to full de novo review by the ICC.226  No 
conviction results merely from the referral.  In fact, as noted above, 
the Security Council determination will in no way bind the ICC.227  
Thus, if the Security Council is making a “policy judgment” in 
making its referral, it would neither bind the ICC nor “make a 
person criminally responsible.”228  Furthermore, because Security 
Council referrals will be only one path by which an aggression case 
may commence—the ICC may also initiate cases after State Party 
referral or proprio motu action229—concerns of having a political 
body play such a role regarding a judicial institution (a concern 
expressed during negotiations) are certainly lessened.  
To the extent Glennon suggests that the Security Council might 
make a referral in one case (case A) and not another (case B), when 
both situations appear to involve similar acts of aggression, and the 
decision would be “arbitrary” or “discriminatory,”230 the problem 
is minimized because an aggression case may be triggered by two 
other methods—State Party referral or prosecutor initiation.231  If 
 
224 See supra Section 1.2. 
225 Glennon, supra note 1, at 104 (emphasis added). 
226 See supra note 164. 
227 Id. 
228 Glennon, supra note 1, at 104. 
229 See supra Section 1.2. 
230 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 103 (noting the Council’s broad leeway to 
render decisions and arguing that the Council’s decisions are ultimate policy 
judgments based on an ad hoc and subjective basis).  
231 Furthermore, there are other cases in which an intervening decision has to 
be taken before a prosecution may begin; for instance, a diplomat can be 
prosecuted if there is a waiver of immunity, and such waiver is discretionary.  See 
E-mail from Pål Wrange, supra note 64.  Thus, the fact of an intervening decision 
(even one that is discretionary) hardly shows procedural infirmity. 
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Glennon is really troubled by the Security Council’s discretion to 
act in some situations and not others, would he condemn the 
Security Council’s referral of the Darfur and Libya situations232 
because other referrals have not have been made?233  The Security 
Council’s referral ability, of course, was enshrined in the original 
Rome Statute,234 and not the Kampala amendment.235 
Admittedly, the field of international justice is not fully a level 
playing field.  Why did the Security Council create an international 
tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda (the ICTR), but not in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”)?  Why is there a hybrid 
tribunal for crimes committed in Cambodia (the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)),236 but not in 
Afghanistan?  One might argue that this situation is “arbitrary” or 
“discriminatory” (this author would argue it is political), but this 
kind of unequal enforcement of international criminal law 
presently exists.237  This situation, however, does not suggest there 
should be no ICTR and ECCC prosecutions because there are no 
corollary tribunals for the DRC or Afghanistan.  Nor does it 
suggest that there was anything wrong with the Security Council’s 
two ICC referrals.  Rather, it suggests the need for more 
 
232 See S/RES/1593 (2005), supra note 45, ¶ 1 (resolving to refer the situation 
in Darfur since July 2002 to the ICC Prosecutor); see also S/RES/1970 (2011), supra 
note 46, ¶ 4 (referring the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since February 
2011 to the ICC Prosecutor). 
233 For example, the Security Council has not made an ICC referral of the 
situation in Syria, despite high estimates of protesters being killed.  See Khaled 
Yacoub Oweis, Assad Forces Fire on Protesters Across Syria, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2011, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-syria-
idUSTRE76T02020110802 (reporting on the lack of agreement amongst the 
Security Council regarding a resolution on the Syria uprising). 
234 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b) (granting ICC jurisdiction where 
the Security Council refers a situation involving a relevant crime to the ICC 
Prosecutor). 
235 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
236 The ECCC was created by agreement between the U.N. and the 
Government of Cambodia.  See Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian 
Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-
Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 41723. 
237 Parallels exist in the field of human rights, which has three regional 
human rights courts (the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, and the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights), 
but no human rights courts in other regions and no global human rights court. 
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internationalized judicial institutions, such as international or 
hybrid tribunals, and more focus on the rebuilding of national 
judiciaries to enable additional prosecutions.  At the ICC level, it 
suggests one should strive for universal ratification of the Rome 
Statute, and, absent universal ratification, vigilant Security Council 
action to refer all appropriate situations to the ICC. 
2.3.2.   The Perceived Danger of Excluding the Security Council in 
Making Aggression Referrals 
Glennon next argues that excluding the Security Council 
entirely from making aggression referrals—another possible option 
when he wrote his article, but one that is now moot—would also 
be problematic, because it would run afoul of the U.N. Charter.238  
Glennon (correctly) notes that under Article 39 of the Charter, the 
Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”239  
This led some states to argue that the Security Council necessarily 
had to be involved, or be the only body involved, in the 
determination of an “act of aggression,” but other states have 
argued that Article 39 concerns Chapter VII enforcement actions 
and does not necessarily apply in the context of criminal 
adjudications.240 
To a fair degree, these issues are moot.  Whereas it might have 
been possible to exclude the Security Council from playing any 
role in aggression referrals, for instance, under the theory that its 
powers are for purposes of Chapter VII enforcement and not 
criminal adjudication, such exclusion certainly ran a risk that the 
Rome Statute would be seen as contradicting the U.N. Charter.  As 
noted above, in the event of contradiction, Article 103 of the 
Charter provides that the Charter would prevail.241  Moreover, 
 
238 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 104 (arguing that there are three possible 
ways to interpret Article 39, none of which provide for the exclusion of the 
Security Council’s role). 
239 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
240 Glennon has labeled the various approaches “concurrent,” “preemptive” 
and “plenary” Security Council power to determine the existence of aggression, 
but this terminology was not used in the actual negotiations and will not be 
adopted here.  Glennon, supra note 1, at 104–05. 
241 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  States may also have chosen to 
include a role for the Security Council out of more pragmatic, and not purely 
legal, considerations.  See E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36.  
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States Parties to the Rome Statute have not made Security Council 
determinations a necessary pre-requisite for ICC adjudication, 
which was seen to risk undermining the ICC’s independence by 
giving a political body too much control over the docket of a 
judicial institution.  The result reached—that the Security Council 
is one possible route to trigger ICC cases but there are other 
routes—was generally perceived as both respecting the Security 
Council’s role and preserving the ICC’s independence, and 
appears the best possible solution. 
Glennon also raises the concern that the ICC and Security 
Council might come to opposite conclusions, suggesting this 
would lead to aspersions on the fact-finding or law-finding 
competence of the other institution.242  First, because different 
bodies within the international system do have different 
competences, the potential for inconsistent determinations within 
the international legal system in fact already exists.  The ICTY and 
ICC have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, but the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) may adjudicate claims of 
genocide between states in civil cases; yet, there is no mechanism 
to harmonize these determinations.  The same potential for conflict 
exists between the ICJ and Security Council, which both may 
examine boundary disputes.243  Inconsistencies are a consequence 
of the diffuse nature of the international legal system, which 
involves various international bodies, with no overall appellate 
mechanism to harmonize results.  Yet, the potential for inconsistent 
rulings has never been seen as reason for these institutions not to 
exercise jurisdiction.244 
 
242 Glennon, supra note 1, at 106 (arguing about the danger of contradictory 
findings). 
243 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 
Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (adjudicating territorial claims between Chad and 
Libya over the Ouzou strip). 
244 The Security Council can also minimize such potentials for inconsistency 
by (i) making general referrals that do not mention the state act of aggression; (ii) 
utilizing the term “threat to the peace” to trigger Chapter VII action without 
opining on whether there has been an act of aggression in legal terms; and (iii) if 
there is ambiguity as to which state has committed an act of aggression, making a 
referral that does not specify which state is the aggressor state.  E-mail from Pål 
Wrange, supra note 64.  An alternative view might be that the quite distant danger 
that a Security Council determination would be reviewed by a judicial institution 
could be a good thing.  Id.  This author views the issue slightly differently; the 
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Second, the potential for conflict appears overstated:  the ICC 
and Security Council will conduct different evaluations.  The ICC 
will adjudicate the crime of aggression using the definition agreed 
upon at the Review Conference.  The Security Council will act 
under its competence as to international peace and security, 
applying Article 39 for purposes of taking action under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter.  As to Glennon’s suggestion that 
inconsistencies between the bodies would lead to aspersions on 
“the fact-finding or law-finding competence of the other,” the 
Security Council does not conduct express fact-finding or law-
finding in the way a judicial body does.  Its resolutions are far less 
detailed than a criminal judgment, and, as explained above, the 
Security Council will not necessarily apply the ICC definition.  The 
Security Council has historically rarely determined that an act of 
aggression has actually occurred,245 and even if it makes an ICC 
aggression referral, it certainly has the option of making the 
referral without expressly finding that aggression occurred.246  
Finally, Glennon concludes that an appropriate solution is only 
achievable with a U.N. Charter amendment247—a concern this 
author does not recollect being articulated over the more than ten 
years of aggression negotiations.  Glennon is concerned both that 
the ICC could “get the jump” on the Security Council, and that the 
Security Council could make a determination opposite one earlier 
 
Security Council and ICC will be making different determinations, and thus the 
ICC will not sit in review of the Security Council.  
245 See id. 
246 Article 15 ter specifies no requirement that the Security Council make any 
express finding that there has been a state act of aggression.  See New Def., supra 
note 4, art. 15 ter, ¶ 1 (providing that the Security Council may make a referral 
pursuant to Rome Statute art. 13(b)—which permits it to refer a “situation” to the 
court).  See also Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b) (allowing the Security 
Council to refer “situations” to the Prosecutor and giving the International 
Criminal Court jurisdiction over those matters).  
247 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 107.  Glennon also seems to confuse the 
amendment procedures, suggesting that Rome Statute Articles 121(4) and 121(5) 
would both be utilized simultaneously.  See id. at 113.  In fact, virtually every 
proposal (and the ultimate Amendment) used one provision or the other, but not 
both.  Here again, Glennon’s lack of attention to the actual negotiations is telling.  
While the so-called ABS Proposal (by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland) made at 
the Review Conference did involve using both provisions, they would have 
pertained to different Rome Statute amendments.  For the text of the ABS 
Proposal, see Trahan, supra note 16, at Appendix A.  
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made by the ICC.248  He concludes that the Security Council would 
need a given period when it exclusively could act, but that would 
require a Charter amendment.  First, the Review Conference 
outcome gives the Security Council the first opportunity to act in 
making a referral for an exclusive six month period,249 yet that has 
been achieved by an amendment to the Rome Statute, not a 
Charter amendment.  In terms of the Security Council making a 
determination opposite one earlier made by the ICC, it is true that 
the Security Council could stop an ICC aggression case that was 
proceeding, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.250  Yet an Article 
16 decision by the Security Council could indicate that it viewed 
the proceedings as jeopardizing international peace and security, 
and not necessarily indicate a determination in substance contrary 
to the ICC’s view on whether a state act of aggression had 
occurred.  Furthermore, the ability of the Security Council to defer 
a proceeding was something agreed upon in Rome, not 
Kampala.251  Lastly, Glennon worries that the ICC could go ahead 
with a prosecution despite an “implicit or explicit finding by the 
Security Council that no aggression had occurred.”252  This 
probably would be difficult because the Prosecutor would have to 
show a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, and the 
Court might not find that burden met in the wake of a Security 
Council determination that aggression did not occur—which the 
Court could consider, although it is not binding.253  Moreover, if 
that were to occur, the Security Council would always have the 
option of using its deferral powers and stop the ICC from 
proceeding.254 
 
248 See Glennon, supra note 1, at 107.  
249 See New Def., supra note 4, art. 15 bis, ¶¶ 6–8 (stating that a Prosecutor can 
only proceed in investigating a crime of aggression six months after the 
Prosecutor notifies the Security Council of plans to investigate). 
250 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution 
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 
months after the Security Council . . . has requested the Court to that effect . . . .”). 
251 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
252 Glennon, supra note 1, at 109. 
253 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
254 In fact, a Security Council finding that no aggression has occurred, if it 
cites Rome Statute Article 16, would probably constitute a pre-emptive deferral 
that would stop the Court from acting in the first place.  See supra note 250 and 
accompanying text. 
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Thus, Glennon’s concerns about the role of the Security 
Council, which generally assume the Security Council has no role 
or an exclusive role in aggression referrals, are to a fair extent 
moot.  The agreement reached, which will permit a Security 
Council role but not mandate one, has created a solution that is 
both consistent with the U.N. Charter and preserves the ICC’s 
independence. 
3. WHY THE AGREEMENT HAS NOT FAILED 
At least eighty-four delegations from States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, who ultimately agreed by consensus vote at the Review 
Conference to the amendment on the crime of aggression, clearly 
view the amendment as a success.  As Glennon admits, there is no 
reason why aggression “or any other crime, cannot be defined with 
sufficient specificity . . . .”255  This final Section addresses Glennon’s 
final arguments why agreement on the definition has purportedly 
failed. 
Glennon argues that the reason agreement on the crime of 
aggression has proven elusive is “cultural and political,” in that the 
world sees itself in terms of states “that see themselves historically 
as victims of aggression” and “states that do not see themselves as 
historic victims of aggression,” and the views of these basic groups 
conflict making the “zone of potential agreement” between them 
“miniscule.”256  Since Glennon wrote his article, that agreement was 
reached, thereby mooting the crux of his argument.  Glennon, 
however, is probably right to say that states see themselves either 
as potential victims of aggression or as potential aggressor states, 
but this diversity of views did not prevent agreement from being 
reached.  How states view themselves may impact:  (a) whether a 
State Party ratifies the aggression amendment (States Parties that 
see themselves as potential victim states, or as strong proponents 
of the rule of law and supporters of the ICC can be expected to 
ratify); (b) whether a State Party exercises an opt out declaration 
(States Parties that see themselves as potential aggressor states 
might be tempted to do so); or (c) whether a state continues to 
 
255 Glennon, supra note 1, at 109.  This statement contradicts Glennon’s earlier 
criticism of those who “believe the crime of aggression is perforce capable of 
being defined.”  Id. at 72. 
256 Glennon, supra note 1, at 111. 
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remain outside the Rome Statute system, and is able to utilize the 
complete aggression jurisdiction exemption for non-States Parties 
(again, states that see themselves as potential aggressor states 
might be tempted to do so).257  The jurisdictional agreement 
reached does not create a level playing field and uniform 
application of the rule of law (but neither did the original Rome 
Statute, whereby States Parties and non-States Parties are treated 
quite differently in terms of jurisdiction), but it was probably the 
best jurisdictional regime that could be negotiated under the 
circumstances. 
Glennon’s final lament is that the ICC risks developing into a 
potentially powerful international force “with interests antithetical 
to those of the United States.”258  The core focus of the ICC to date 
has been the prosecution of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity where the worst mass crimes occur.259  This 
country should have no trouble supporting such prosecutions.  
Indeed, statements by U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Stephen J. 
Rapp suggest that is the case.260  The United States should not view 
 
257 This analysis assumes states are primarily concerned about the protection 
of their leaders from prosecution.  One could envision a very different scenario 
where the state is concerned about becoming an aggressor state and therefore 
ratifies the amendment without an opt-out declaration to prevent aggression by 
its future leaders.  E-mail from Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 36. 
258 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112. 
259 The ICC, for example, is focusing its cases on atrocity crime situations 
such as large-scale use of child soldiers and horrific gender crimes of mass sexual 
violence.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 12 (Jan. 27, 2007), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF (proceeding against 
Lubanga, a former rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of Congo, tried for 
conscripting, enlisting, and using child soldiers); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges. ¶¶ 
71-72 & 210-212 (June 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc699541.pdf (trying Bemba, alleged President and Commander in Chief of the 
MLC, for crimes against humanity and war crimes, including rape). 
260 Ambassador Rapp has stated: 
[W]e recognized in March [2010] when we participated in the Assembly 
of States Parties in New York, it’s in our interest to support those [ICC] 
prosecutions—not at this time as a member of the ICC, but in kind with 
assistance as long as it’s consistent with our law.  And at the same time 
that we support those prosecutions, also work on the whole of the 
international justice system, the key part of which is that that is below 
the level of the international system, the massive amount of work that 
needs to be done at the national level. 
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developments regarding the crime of aggression as “antithetical” 
to its interests; no country should have an interest in aggressive 
use of force.  Nonetheless, this argument is largely academic 
because, as explained above, the United States, as a non-State 
Party, will be exempt from aggression jurisdiction.261  Glennon 
concludes (as if approvingly) that “senior U.S. officials will 
nonetheless be safe because the United States is not a party to the 
Rome Statute,” characterizing the ICC as having the potential to be 
a “ruinous train wreck.”262  Is it really praiseworthy that U.S. 
officials should be exempt from violating a core foundational norm 
of the U.N. system—Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the aggressive use 
of force?  Is the ICC, with skilled judges selected by 121 States 
Parties (including some close U.S. allies) and a plethora of 
procedural protections to ensure fair trials,263 really a potentially 
 
Special Briefing at U.S. Dep’t of State with Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Engagement With the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently 
Concluded Review Conference, in D.C. (June 15, 2010), transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/143178.htm (emphasis 
added). 
261 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
262 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112–113. 
263 The Rome Statute requires the following comprehensive fair trial 
protections, including all the due process protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 
except for trial by jury: 
(i) the right to remain silent or to not testify against oneself (art. 67, 
¶ 1(g)); 
(ii) the right against self-incrimination (arts. 54, ¶ 1(a); 67, ¶ 1(g)); 
(iii) the right to cross-examine witnesses (art. 67, ¶ 1(e)); 
(iv) the right to be tried without undue delay (art. 67); 
(v) the protection against double jeopardy (art. 20); 
(vi) the right to be present at trial (arts. 63; 67, ¶ 1; 67, ¶ 1(c)); 
(vii) the presumption of innocence (art. 66); 
(viii)the right to assistance of counsel (art. 67; ¶ 1(b), (d)); 
(ix) the right to a written statement of charges (art. 61, ¶ 3); 
(x) the right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses (art. 
67, ¶ 1(e)); 
(xi) the prohibition against ex post facto crimes (art. 22); 
(xii) the freedom from warrantless arrest and search (arts. 57, ¶ 3; 
58); 
(xiii)the ability to exclude illegally obtained evidence (art. 69, ¶ 7)). 
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“ruinous train wreck”?  Why does Glennon suggest the ICC is 
dominated “by interests antithetical to those of the United 
States”?264  Can he possibly mean to imply that the United States 
has more in common with non-States Parties such as China, Russia, 
Myanmar, and Iran rather than States Parties such as Canada, the 
U.K., Australia, and Japan?  This author sees things very 
differently.  The Assembly of States Parties should be commended 
for their historic accomplishment, which with time has the 
potential to change the international landscape by discouraging 
unnecessary uses of force and bringing the international 
community one step closer to full utilization of the collective 
system of international peace and security envisioned under the 
U.N. Charter. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Despite technical errors and ignorance of the extensive 
negotiating history of the crime of aggression, Glennon in his 
article is asking interesting questions, ones that should have been 
debated within U.S. Government and academic circles long before 
now.  That they were not debated appears largely to have been a 
result of the Bush Administration’s decision not to attend the 
negotiations of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression—a squandered opportunity to shape the definition on 
a very significant issue.  That more attention was not paid perhaps 
stemmed from an erroneous assumption that the negotiations 
would not be successful; indeed, for a while, the negotiations 
appeared squarely mired down in the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, while progress was still being made on the definition.  
Those who did not take the work of the Special Working Group 
seriously made a miscalculation.  By the time the U.S. delegation 
(under the Obama Administration) started attending the 
negotiations,265 the definition and elements of the crime were 
 
The above-listed fair trial rights compilation is found in AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, SAFEGUARDS IN THE ROME STATUTE 
AGAINST ABUSE OF THE COURT TO HARASS AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS AND CIVILIAN 
OFFICIALS, 7 (2001), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Safeguards.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
264 Glennon, supra note 1, at 112. 
265 This author urged the United States to attend such negotiations.  See Letter 
from Am. Branch of the Int’l Law Assn. Int’l Criminal Court Comm. to Harold H. 
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essentially complete, leaving the United States with no real role to 
play in their drafting.266 
 
Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://ila-
americanbranch.org/reports/2010-03-19_ICC_Letter.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) 
(detailing the negotiations on the crime of aggression and differentiating between 
closed issues where it appeared too late for the United States to play an active role 
in negotiations and open issues on which the United States still had room to 
engage). 
266 The best the United States could achieve under the circumstances was 
what it did—concentrate on adding “Understandings” to the definition, four of 
which were adopted at the Review Conference, and engage in negotiations as to 
the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.  The Understandings that the United 
States endorsed and which were adopted provide: 
Domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the 
definition of the act of aggression and the crime of aggression 
do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments 
shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than 
this Statute. 
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as 
creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction 
with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State. 
Other understandings 
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and 
dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a 
determination whether an act of aggression has been committed 
requires consideration of all the circumstances of each 
particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and 
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
7. It is understood that in establishing whether an act of 
aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and 
scale must be sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. 
No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the 
manifest standard by itself. 
New Def. Understandings, supra note 109.  The Understandings in paragraphs 4–
5 were already included in the proposed Understandings in an earlier Conference 
Room paper.  See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, [Draft] Understandings 
Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
the Crime of Aggression, Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression, 
RC/WGCA/1/Rev.1, Annex III, ¶ 4 bis (June 10, 2010). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
01 TRAHAN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:58 PM 
968 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:4 
Yet, while Glennon is asking provocative and interesting 
questions, it is also important to get the technical details correct.  
There is no point in reading paragraph 2 of the definition without 
the context of paragraph 1 (as he does), or ignoring the negotiating 
history with respect to the definition of the crime.  Nor do his 
arguments that “planning” social security for military members 
might be the crime of aggression267 help the debate, since they so 
obviously miss the mark.  His arguments that self-defense and 
Chapter VII authorized enforcement actions fall within the term 
“act of aggression” also completely fail since they are authorized 
under the U.N. Charter and certainly permissible.268  Finally, the 
fear-mongering aspect of his article has to be dispelled:  (i) past 
U.S. actions will not be covered because the definition is not 
retroactive; (ii) future U.S. actions will not be covered while the 
United States is a non-State Party; (iii) even if the United States 
were to join the Rome Statute for purposes of the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could still 
exercise an “opt out” declaration and avoid ICC aggression 
referrals triggered by State Party or proprio motu action; and (iv) as 
a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States 
already is in a position to ensure there is no Security Council 
aggression (or other) referral as to action on its territory or by its 
nationals.  One can debate whether this ironclad exclusion of the 
United States from ICC aggression jurisdiction is a good thing or 
not—some states no doubt view it as reprehensible in placing the 
United States above the rule of law as to this crime—but this is 
how the amendment is structured.269  It is time to accurately and 
 
267 Glennon, supra note 1, at 99. 
268 See supra Section 2.2.1 (discussing Glennon’s distortion of what constitutes 
an act of aggression). 
269 The U.S. delegation in Kampala, in its closing remarks delivered by State 
Dep’t Legal Adviser Harold H. Koh, made some suggestion of wanting to revisit 
some of the issues concluded at the Review Conference.  Harold H. Koh, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Closing Intervention at the Review Conference of the 
International Criminal Court (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
s/l/releases/remarks/143218.htm.  Yet, in terms of avoiding ICC jurisdiction 
over U.S. nationals (assuming that was a major goal of the delegation), the United 
States clearly achieved that result.  See Wrange, Of Power and Justice, supra note 
126, at 946 (stating that “a reluctance to submit its armed forces to international 
criminal law scrutiny may not be far-fetched for a country with wide exposure”). 
 If the United States is truly still concerned with aggression exposure, the real 
risk is arguably not from the ICC, but the possibility of national court aggression 
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soberly assess the achievements of the ICC definition of the crime 
of aggression and the strengths (and weaknesses) of the conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction agreed upon at the ICC Review 
Conference.  Glennon’s article, while raising interesting questions, 




prosecutions.  If that is the case, the United States might consider whether to 
advocate that in future amendments a primacy regime be created for the crime of 
aggression, so that national court aggression prosecutions might at least be tried 
before the ICC, which, with all its checks and balances and protection of 
defendants’ fair trial rights, could well be the preferable forum for such 
adjudications.  See Trahan, supra note 109 (discussing concerns with 
complementarity and the crime of aggression). 
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